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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
LIQUIDITY, GOVERNANCE AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN ASSET PRICING 
by 
Sascha Strobl 
Florida International University, 2013 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Suchismita Mishra, Co-Major Professor 
Professor Arun J Prakash, Co-Major Professor 
 A plethora of recent literature on asset pricing provides plenty of empirical 
evidence on the importance of liquidity, governance and adverse selection of equity on 
pricing of assets together with more traditional factors such as market beta and the Fama-
French factors. However, literature has usually stressed that these factors are priced 
individually. In this dissertation we argue that these factors may be related to each other, 
hence not only individual but also joint tests of their significance is called for.  
In the three related essays, we examine the liquidity premium in the context of the 
finer three-digit SIC industry classification, joint importance of liquidity and governance 
factors as well as governance and adverse selection. Recent studies by Core, Guay and 
Rusticus (2006) and Ben-Rephael, Kadan and Wohl (2010) find that governance and 
liquidity premiums are dwindling in the last few years. One reason could be that liquidity 
is very unevenly distributed across industries. This could affect the interpretation of prior 
liquidity studies. Thus, in the first chapter we analyze the relation of industry clustering 
and liquidity risk following a finer industry classification suggested by Johnson, 
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Moorman and Sorescu (2009). In the second chapter, we examine the dwindling 
influence of the governance factor if taken simultaneously with liquidity. We argue that 
this happens since governance characteristics are potentially a proxy for information 
asymmetry that may be better captured by market liquidity of a company’s shares. Hence, 
we jointly examine both the factors, namely, governance and liquidity – in a series of 
standard asset pricing tests. Our results reconfirm the importance of governance and 
liquidity in explaining stock returns thus independently corroborating the findings of 
Amihud (2002) and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). Moreover, governance is not 
subsumed by liquidity. Lastly, we analyze the relation of governance and adverse 
selection, and again corroborate previous findings of a priced governance factor. 
Furthermore, we ascertain the importance of microstructure measures in asset pricing by 
employing Huang and Stoll’s (1997) method to extract an adverse selection variable and 
finding evidence for its explanatory power in four-factor regressions. 
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PREFACE TO THE DISSERTATION 
 This dissertation consists of   three interlinked essays on liquidity, governance and 
adverse selection in asset pricing.  Even though all the essays are interlinked but they 
have been presented in such a way that they are quite independent as well. Therefore, the 
introduction etc. related to any particular essay has been provided in the concerned essay 
itself. Hence, there is no introduction chapter as such but to familiarize the reader, we   
provide a synopsis of each of the essays below. 
In these closely related essays, we examine the liquidity premium in the context 
of the finer three-digit SIC industry classification, the joint importance of liquidity and 
governance factors as well as the joint effect of governance and adverse selection. 
In first essay entitled “Liquidity Premium and Industry Clustering Effect”, we 
analyze the influence of industry-specific differences on market liquidity and its 
subsequent impact on stock returns in the asset-pricing paradigm. To the best of our 
knowledge, so far this has not been done.  We follow an approach similar to Johnson, 
Moorman and Sorescu (2009) and use the three-digit SIC codes to study industry 
clustering. We look into the industry composition of liquidity sorted portfolios as well as 
portfolios mimicking the best and worst liquidity portfolios. Our results show that 
industry effects significantly affect liquidity in some tests although neither dominates the 
other and, thus, both have to be considered in a comprehensive asset-pricing model.  
In the second essay, “Governance and Liquidity in Asset Pricing,” we analyze the 
dwindling influence of the governance factor if taken simultaneously with liquidity.   In 
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recent times considerable attention from academics and practitioners has been paid on 
corporate governance in the last decades since investors are more mature in their 
demands of good management of their investments. This weariness and activism on part 
of the investors have increased following corporate scandals such as Enron, WorldCom 
and later the financial crisis.  
In the last essay, “Governance and Adverse Selection in Asset Pricing,” we 
investigate the link between governance and adverse selection, since the latter measure is 
supposed to capture information asymmetry contained in liquidity. Information is the 
most valuable product made anywhere in the world as it is the key to interact sensibly and 
successfully with our environment. To make smart choices we need to know as much 
about the consequences of our actions as possible. The more information we have the 
better we are able to compete for scarce resources and outperform our competitors.. At 
the same time the lack of information not only will make markets inefficient but then 
investors will require a higher premium for this disadvantage. Thus in this essay we 
present our results after analyzing all the attendant advantages (disadvantages) due to 
availability (unavailability) of information.  
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CHAPTER 1: LIQUIDITY PREMIUM AND INDUSTRY CLUSTERING EFFECT 
1.1 Introduction 
 Barriers to enter a product market define among other things the intensity of 
competition between companies.1 The ability to generate profits is dependent on this 
intensity of competition; in other words, the industry in which a company is engaged is a 
crucial factor in determining that company’s profitability. It has been established that 
standard asset pricing models are imprecise in capturing differences between industries; 
for example, Fama and French (1997) found that standard errors are above 3% in 
estimations of industry cost of capital.2 Not only returns differ widely across industries, 
the liquidity is very different as well. The maximum time-average of Amihud’s (2002) 
Illiquidity is 6.10, whereas the minimum is nearly zero. Furthermore, the standard 
deviation is nearly three times the mean illiquidity of 0.18. Hence, we expect that 
liquidity is not only clustered in certain industries but that this clustering is responsible 
for the liquidity premia found in previous studies. Since the pioneering research of 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and others3  was published, liquidity has become an 
essential part of modern asset-pricing models. Therefore, we contribute to the existing 
literature by formally examining the industry clustering of liquidity. This has not yet been 
conducted in previous studies. We ask in this study whether or not liquidity and industry 
characteristics are linked together. Fast-growing industries might attract more investors, 
and therefore have higher market liquidity. On the other hand, investors might shy away 
                                                             
1 See Bain (1968). 
2 See also Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and Hou and Robinson (2006). 
3 See also Amihud (2002), Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and others. 
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due to information asymmetries, since faster growth often implies fast changing and new 
business environments where insiders have superior knowledge. Thus, liquidity 
characteristics could be closely associated with an industry group and hence one factor 
could significantly affect the other. Since Johnson, Moorman and Sorescu (2009) 
investigated the results found by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), and attributed them 
to industry clustering, a study of liquidity and industry clustering is warranted. Johnson et 
al. concluded that the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry classification is not fine 
enough to capture important aspects of cross-sectional differences; therefore, they used 
the more detailed three-digit SIC codes. After they adjusted the long-term returns sorted 
by governance, the abnormal returns found by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) were 
zero. We follow a similar approach, using the three-digit SIC codes to study industry 
clustering. We ask if industry-effects are caused by differences in liquidity cross-
sectionally. Or, alternatively, is liquidity affected by differences between industries? To 
find this answer, we look into the industry composition of liquidity-sorted portfolios as 
well as portfolios mimicking the best and worst liquidity portfolios. Our results show that 
industry effects significantly affect liquidity in some tests, although neither dominates the 
other and, thus, both have to be considered in a comprehensive asset-pricing model. 
Therefore, industry clustering is not driving the liquidity premium. Furthermore, we run 
multi-factor regressions using the Fama-French three-factor model which includes 
momentum (as proposed by Carhart, 1997) and liquidity for each industry. This shows 
that liquidity indeed is a significant explanatory variable, although it does not fully 
explain variations between industries. The results confirm the importance of 
incorporating industry effects in models and so we continue our study with further 
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analyses. We then mimic the most liquid and least liquid portfolios and use them in 
specification regressions. Again, the results confirm the importance of both factors. We 
find evidence that supports our alternative hypothesis which states that industry and 
liquidity characteristics are both needed to meaningfully explain differences in returns 
among stocks. Our proxies for liquidity in this study are Amihud’s Illiquidity as well as 
Pastor-Stambaugh’s liquidity factor.  
Section 1.2 provides a brief overview of the relevant literature; Section 1.3 
explains the data and methodology used in this study, while Section 1.4 presents the 
results and Section 1.5 concludes this chapter. 
1.2 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
“Liquidity” means the ease to turn a financial asset into cash with little or no 
discount. Thus, stocks with low liquidity should have returns, including a premium for 
liquidity risks. Amihud and Mendelson (1986), who pioneered in this field, proposed a 
negative return-liquidity relationship. Plenty of studies have followed their early work, 
again using the bid-ask spread, or other, better measures for liquidity. Among those 
measures are the turnover ratio (Chan and Faff, 2005; Datar, Naik, & Radcliffe, 1998), 
the illiquidity ratio (Amihud, 2002) and trading volume (Brennan, Chordia, & 
Subrahmanyam, 1998). Researchers looked into the way liquidity affects asset pricing 
and whether or not traditional asset pricing models are able to capture liquidity risk. 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) found that high liquidity is related to higher stock returns 
and that liquidity risk and momentum risk are connected. Amihud (2002) concluded that 
the market risk premium also compensates investors for illiquidity risk. He found that this 
risk is more pronounced in small firm stocks, and that it develops a new measure for 
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liquidity—the illiquidity ratio. This measure is also known as Amihud’s Illiquidity and is 
widely used in liquidity studies, such as ours. Next, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) 
enhanced the traditional CAPM by including liquidity risk and showed that the 
explanatory power of this model is superior. Nguyen, Mishra, Prakash and Ghosh (2007) 
investigated the ability of the Fama-French three-factor model and the higher moment 
models to capture liquidity risk. Liquidity is now well established as an important risk 
factor that captures more than idiosyncratic risks—it captures market-wide systematic 
risk components. 
Further studies examined the microstructure of liquidity issues. Baker and Stein 
(2004) constructed a model which links liquidity to stock returns with the help of 
irrational investors boosting the levels of liquidity since they cannot discern the 
information content of the order flow. Chordia et al. (2002) showed that order imbalances 
have a negative effect on liquidity and market returns. Furthermore, changes in liquidity 
can be predicted by market returns. Chordia et al. (2001) found that liquidity is acting 
asymmetrically and falls more in weak market conditions than it rises in good market 
conditions. Moreover, interest rate changes allow liquidity measures to fluctuate. Before 
that, Chordia et al. (2000) investigated the determinants of liquidity, concentrating on 
commonality. They showed that inventory risk and information asymmetry affects 
liquidity.  
The second important aspect besides liquidity in our study concerns industry 
clustering. Fama and French (1997) analyzed the capabilities of the three-factor model 
and the CAPM in explaining industry returns and discovered that standard errors are 
above 3% in estimations of industry cost of capital. Hou and Robinson (2006) 
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investigated the influences of the composition of an industry on the stock returns of firms 
and discovered that firms in more competitive industries are commanding premia, thus 
compensating for that risk. MacKay and Phillips (2005) examined the influence of 
industry structure on a company’s decision-making abilities. They concluded that 
competitive industries lead to a more diverse decision making set. Chan et al. (2007) 
analyzed different industry classification systems and found that portfolios of stocks 
based on industries exhibit more return co-movement than other clustering techniques. 
Most studies rely on a very broad industry classification system. This simple 
approach may not be sufficient to detect the information contained in narrower 
definitions. Johnson et al. (2009) concluded that the previous studies concerned with 
governance, such as Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), used models that are not well 
specified. They found that the long-term excess returns are due to industry clustering. 
Johnson et al. examined the results using the finer three-digit SIC codes, whereas 
Gompers et al. based their findings on the Fama-French 48 industry portfolios. This leads 
to the goal of our study, which is to analyze the effect that industry clustering (using 
three-digit SIC codes) has on liquidity in an asset-pricing framework. We will achieve 
this by testing our null hypothesis, which states that industry clustering has no effect on 
liquidity characteristics in asset pricing.  
1.3 Data and Methodology 
 The sample data consists of all NYSE-AMEX companies included in the CRSP 
database, available at WRDS, from 1980 to 2009. Utility companies and financial 
companies were excluded due to their highly regulated legal environment. Firm-months 
were kept as if the stock price was above $5, and if there were more than $3 million 
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shares outstanding and more than 10,000 shares traded. We winsorize our return and 
illiquidity data to remove the influence of outliers at extreme probability levels of 1% and 
99%. We use the monthly version of Amihud’s Illiquidity measure as a proxy for 
illiquidity as follows 
ܫܮܮܫܳ௜௠ = 1/ܦ௜௠ ∑ |ܴ௜௠|/ܸܱܮܦ௜௠ௗ஽೔೘௧ୀଵ                                                                            (1)  
 
where D୧୫ is the number of daily observations for stock i in month m. ܴ௜௠ is the daily 
return of stock i in month m and ܸܱܮܦ௜௠ௗ is the daily volume of stock i in month m. 
Then we standardize the measure by dividing it by the market-wide illiquidity of each 
month m. We use the three-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) codes to define 
our industry classifications following Johnson et al. (2009) (see Table 1.1). The CRSP 
database contains 526 industries available for these years. After applying our restrictions, 
333 industries are left. 
We begin the study by examining high and low liquidity portfolios to determine if 
they are clustered in certain industries in each year or in all years combined. We then 
investigate the difference between extreme liquidity portfolios and portfolios emulating 
the relative market equity across industry groups of these extreme liquidity portfolios. 
This step is to analyze whether they offer the same industry profile or not. Moreover, we 
employ standard asset pricing tests to see if liquidity is able to explain performance 
differences of industries. The asset-pricing model used in this study is the four-factor 
model as proposed by Fama-French (1993), plus a momentum factor as suggested by 
Carhart (1997). The Fama-French factors are taken from WRDS as well. Essentially we 
use the following enhanced version of the Fama-French model 
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ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߛ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߜ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߠ௜ܷܯܦ௧+ߝ௜,௧                           (2)    
       
where ܴ௜ is the return of asset i, ܴ௠ is the market return and ܵܯܤ௧, ܪܯܮ௧and ܷܯܦ௧are 
the size book-to-market and momentum4 factors, respectively. Additionally, we add a 
fifth factor as a proxy for liquidity. For that, we either use Pastor-Stambaugh’s liquidity 
factor or we construct a zero-investment liquidity factor in the style of the Fama-French 
factors based on Amihud’s Illiquidity. We take the difference of returns on portfolios 
with the highest 30% and lowest 30% illiquidity (ܫܮܫܳ௧). These models are 
ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߛ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߜ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߠ௜ܷܯܦ௧ + ߟ௜ܲܵܮܫܳ௧+ߝ௜,௧       (3)                    
ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߛ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߜ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߠ௜ܷܯܦ௧ + ߟ௜ܫܮܫܳ௧+ߝ௜,௧          (4)      
 
where ܲܵܮܫܳ௧  and ܫܮܫܳ௧  are the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor and our zero-
investment illiquidity factor, respectively. In time-series regressions, a well-specified 
asset-pricing model that is not overly affected by multicollinearity or endogeneity creates 
intercepts that are not different from zero, according to Merton (1973) and Fama and 
French (1993). 
We then create mimicking portfolios similar to Johnson et al. (2009) and use these 
portfolios in specification regressions. For the purpose of mimicking industry clustering 
in the very liquid portfolio, only firms that are not in the very liquid portfolio are selected. 
Likewise, only “non-least liquid” portfolios are selected for mimicking industry 
clustering of the least liquid portfolio. Firms in the random trials are chosen in such a 
way that the total market capitalization of each industry in the trial portfolio is 
                                                             
4 The momentum factor used here is the one created by Kenneth French and available on WRDS. 
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proportional to the market capitalization of that industry in the respective hedge, most 
liquid, or least liquid portfolio. Then we run 250 random trials to test the hypothesis of 
zero mean monthly abnormal returns at theoretical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. Long-run abnormal returns are measured by the regression intercept 
using the four-factor model to see if the four-factor model is well specified in industry-
clustered portfolios. The random sampling of this Monte Carlo style simulation ensures 
that misspecification issues of our method are reduced. 
Finally, a hedge portfolio long in most liquid stocks and short in least liquid 
stocks is used as a dependent variable, where the stocks are weighted in regards to the 
impact their industry has on the total market. This makes the portfolio basically industry-
neutral. We then perform the converse of the above experiment; a mimicking hedge 
portfolio is formed, which is long in stocks mimicking most liquid stocks, and short in 
stocks mimicking least-liquid stocks (i.e. liquidity neutral firms/ stocks)). This is used as 
a dependent variable, where the stocks are re-weighted to have the same industry weights 
as their most and least liquid counterparts. This makes the mimicking hedge portfolio 
essentially liquidity-neutral, but it mimics the industry clustering of the most and least 
liquid firms. These procedures allow us to detect any clustering of liquidity in sorted 
portfolios and to conclude whether market liquidity or industry clustering dominates each 
other. 
1.4 Results 
Table 1.1 lists all the SIC codes and the respective industries predominantly used 
in our study. Summary statistics of the average return across SIC codes and average 
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illiquidity, as well as standard deviation, skewness, maximum and minimum returns and 
illiquidity of three-digit industries, is reported in Table 1.2. The huge difference of 
illiquidity across industries—ranging from (almost) zero to 6.1 with a standard deviation 
of 0.5 and a skewness of over 7—is striking. Already this result shows the importance of 
examining industry clustering in illiquidity. The average return is 1.0% per annum, 
ranging from -2.87% to 4.03%. Amihud’s Illiquidity dropped from 2.09 in 1980 to 0.07 
in 2009 (see Figure 1.1 and Table 1.2). This highlights the overall improvement in 
liquidity in the U.S. equity market. Pastor-Stambaugh’s (2003) liquidity factor 
(PS_INNOV) in our sample and in their (Pastor-Stambaugh) paper is much noisier and 
fluctuates from positive to negative values and back. Since the liquidity factor is a scaled 
measure to reflect the overall growth of the stock market, it does not incorporate 
improved market liquidity in the time series. The factor (PS_INNOV) is a quasi-fitted 
residual of the second-order auto-regression of the liquidity level series.5 
 We start our analysis of the relation between liquidity and industry by looking 
into the industries with the highest and lowest average return during our sample period. If 
liquidity effects in prior asset pricing studies were merely capturing industry clustering, 
we would expect to find high liquidity stocks to be overly represented in low performing 
industries and low liquidity stocks overly represented in industries that had very high 
returns. Table 1.3 reports the five best and five worst three-digit SIC industries in terms 
of cumulative stock returns, according to CRSP files between 1980 and 2009. The first 
column displays the SIC codes of these industries, the second column the average returns, 
and the third the cumulative market equity in millions of dollars. The column %ME 
                                                             
5 See Pastor-Stambaugh (2003) for further details on their liquidity factor. 
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displays the percentage market equity of the respective industries to the overall market. 
Worst LIQ (Best LIQ) reports the percentage weight of the respective industry in the 
worst (best) liquidity group. The best industry had an average return of 23.6% and market 
equity of $437 million. The relative market equity of this industry is 0.003%; the best 
liquidity portfolios have no share in that industry, whereas the worst liquidity portfolio 
has a share of 0.10% or slightly above average. The next four best returning industries are 
again more concentrated in the worst liquidity portfolio than in the best liquidity portfolio, 
indicating a bias. But, the worst liquidity portfolio is also overly represented in all of the 
five worst performing industries, whereas the best liquidity portfolio is not overly 
represented at all, except for SIC 872. Together, this implies that the worst liquidity 
portfolio is overly concentrated in the extreme portfolios and the best liquidity portfolio 
is more present in the middle of the return distribution of industries. This could mean that 
highly active trading in the market in this time period drives big movements in returns. A 
systematic bias toward illiquid stocks, on the other hand, cannot be found. 
 Table 1.4 reports the annual difference in percent (%) between the market equity 
of liquidity groups and average market equity across industries. We take the market 
equity of the low liquidity group (portfolio) for each SIC code and subtract the average 
market equity of this SIC code. We then average these differences across industries in 
each year. Afterward, we repeat this procedure for the high liquidity group and finally 
take the difference between the high and low liquidity groups across industries in each 
year (last column). The difference between low and high liquidity is fairly stable 
throughout our sample time, with a little dip in the nineties. The difference between low 
liquidity and the mean is, contrarily, continuously declining throughout the sample period 
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to 0.07% from 0.49%. The difference between high liquidity and the mean is again 
declining to 0.48% from 0.78%. In both the latter cases, most of the decline occurs in the 
first year of the 30-year sample. Each year of our sample differences between industries 
in terms of liquidity are significant. All p-values for differences in means are less than 
0.001, indicating that liquidity in the form of Amihud’s Illiquidity is dominated, since 
liquidity is more concentrated in some industries as compared to the average company. 
Therefore, we can say that differences in the performance of industries will affect 
measures of liquidity. As there is no other result in our study, this repudiates the 
importance of liquidity in explaining stock returns but does not mean that actual cross-
sectional regression results are purely industry-driven. This would be the case only if all 
(or most) industries where liquidity is high either have high or low returns and vice versa. 
Table 1.3 already discourages such interpretations. 
 Table 1.5 reports the results of four-factor time-series regressions (FF3 plus 
momentum) for the 12 selected three-digit SIC industries. The first four have the highest 
market equity, the next four average market equity, and the last four have the lowest 
market equity of our 333 industries.6 We estimate 
ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߛ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߜ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߠߚ௜ܷܯܦ௧+ߝ௜,௧                         (2)  
 
where for each month t between January 1980 and December 2009 the three-month T-bill 
is deducted from return stock i. ܵܯܤ௧, ܪܯܮ௧ and ܷܯܦ௧ are the size, book-to-market and 
momentum factors. The results show that the four-factor model is not able to explain the 
                                                             
6 The bottom two SICs would be 832 and 965 instead of 961 and 316, but the former two have too few 
observations so that a useful regression result was not feasible and, hence, are replaced by the next larger 
industries. 
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returns of industry-sorted portfolios with intercepts significantly different from zero in 
several regressions. All four factors contribute significantly to the explanation of the 
portfolio returns, with the market return the most significant in all cases. The significance 
found here are similar to the results of Fama-French (1997). At least for the average 
industries there seems to be no explanatory disadvantage by using a narrower industry 
definition. 
 Next, we investigate the potential improvement by adding liquidity as an 
independent variable. Table 1.6 reports the results of five-factor time-series regressions 
(FF3 plus momentum and Pastor-Stambaugh’s liquidity factor) for 12 selected three-digit 
SIC industries. The first four have the highest market equity, the next four have an 
averagely market equity, and the last four have the lowest market equity of our 333 
industries using the following expression 
ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߛ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߜ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߠ௜ܷܯܦ௧ + ߟ௜ܲܵܮܫܳ௧+ߝ௜,௧       (3)     
               
where PSLIQ is the Pastor-Stambaugh’s (PS) liquidity factor. The results show that the 
significance of the intercepts is only marginally improved, although the liquidity factor is 
four times significant at the 1% level. The adjusted R-square increases to 48.9% from 
45.5% in Table 1.5. This highlights the benefit of including this fifth factor in the 
regression. Overall, we conclude that PS liquidity is providing additional explanatory 
power to the regressions in explaining industry portfolio without fully explaining the 
variation in returns over time.  
In Table 1.7, we substitute a liquidity factor based on Amihud’s Illiquidity for 
Pastor-Stambaugh’s liquidity factor. We create this by sorting all stocks according 
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Amihud’s Illiquidity and then subtract the 30th percentile of the most liquid stocks from 
the 30th percentile of the least liquid stocks using the following expression 
ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߛ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߜ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߠ௜ܷܯܦ௧ + ߟ௜ܫܮܫܳ௧+ߝ௜,௧          (4)   
            
where ܫܮܫܳ௧  is the illiquidity zero-investment factor. This liquidity factor appears less 
effective in explaining liquidity compared to the PS factor. ILIQ is only once signifcant 
at the 1% level and three more times at the 5% or 10% level. The intercepts are slightly 
more signifcant than in Table 1.6. In total, we summarize that our five-factor regressions 
show that liquidity is an important explanatory variable in explaining time-series 
regressions of industry-sorted portfolios. Nonetheless, liquidity proxies cannot fully 
explain the variation of returns between industries. These proxies are at least partly 
driven by industry effects, leading to the conclusion that both industry effects and 
liquidity factors are important ingredients in a comprehensive asset-pricing model. 
Table 1.8 reports the average illiquidity values of very liquid and very illiquid 
portfolios across industries, as well as portfolios across the same industries mimicking 
these portfolios. For the purpose of mimicking industry clustering in the very liquid 
portfolio, only firms that are not in the very liquid portfolio are selected. Likewise, only 
“non-least liquid” portfolios are selected for mimicking industry clustering in the least 
liquid portfolio. Firms in 100 random trials are chosen in such a way that the total market 
capitalization of each industry in the trial portfolio is proportional to the market 
capitalization of that industry in the respective hedge, most liquid, or least liquid portfolio. 
We use 10% and 90% as cutoff points for least and most liquidity. The most illiquid 
portfolio has an average of 2.23, the emulation 0.08. The least illiquid portfolio has a 
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value of only 0.001 and the mimicking portfolio has an average of 0.42. This highlights 
the wide range of illiquidity values between industries over time. The clear decline in 
illiquidity over time leaves most values in the tails of the distribution. The difference in 
differences test between extreme portfolios and mimicking portfolios is significant at the 
1% level and shows the validity of the procedure.  
In Table 1.9, we use these mimicking portfolios to run specification regressions. 
First, we employ a hedge portfolio that is long in mimicking least liquid stocks and short 
in mimicking most liquid stocks. Then we employ a portfolio of stocks mimicking least 
liquid stocks, followed by a portfolio of stocks mimicking most liquid stocks. The results 
show that the hedge portfolio is overly rejected on the left and right tail, whereas the 
other two portfolios are only significantly rejected on the right tail. This indicates that 
both industry clustering and liquidity characteristics are important in explaining stock 
returns, thus acting as evidence to support the alternative hypothesis. If liquidity were 
dominating industry clustering, we would expect no significant results at all. On the 
contrary, if industry clustering were responsible for liquidity premium, the results would 
be only significant on the left tail for the most liquid portfolio, on the right tail for the 
least liquid portfolio, and also for the hedge portfolio. 
In Table 1.10, we report the results of two final regressions to conclude our study. 
First, we reweigh companies of the most and least liquid portfolio with the relative 
weights of the industries that these companies are operating in to the overall market. We 
form a hedge portfolio that is long in most liquid and short in least liquid firms that are 
effectively industry-neutral, and use that portfolio return as our dependent variable. 
Lastly, we create mimicking portfolios by taking the “non-most liquid” and “non-least 
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liquid” stocks once more. Then, we weigh the companies in the portfolios according to 
the relative weights that the industries have among one another in the most liquid and 
least liquid portfolio, respectively. Therefore, the mimicking hedge portfolio is basically 
liquidity-neutral. These procedures together allow us to distinguish the effect of industry 
clustering and liquidity characteristics. A major difference compared to the procedures in 
Table 1.9 is that in Table 1.10 the procedure uses all companies in the respective 
portfolios and just reweighs them. In Table 1.9, we use a form of Monte Carlo simulation. 
We also use industry weights in Table 1.10, which are not used in Table 1.9.  
We can see that the hedge portfolio has a significant alpha of minus 1 basis point 
(t = -2.53) and the mimicking hedge portfolio has an insignificant alpha of almost 0 basis 
points (t  = -0.17). This test clearly shows—as no other analysis does in this study—the 
importance of liquidity and repudiates the influence of industry clustering in asset pricing.  
Overall, the results provide ample evidence in support of our alternative 
hypotheses and show that both factors are important. The last test highlights the 
importance of liquidity, whereas, especially, Table 1.4 highlights the influence of 
industry clustering. The other results provide more mixed outcomes leading to our 
conclusion that liquidity and industry clustering provide important information in 
explaining stock returns. 
1.5 Conclusion  
 We investigated liquidity risk and industry clustering and found that both are 
important in explaining stock returns. Our sample consisted of 30 years of data and we 
used Amihud’s Illiquidity as well as Pastor-Stambaugh’s liquidity factor as proxies for 
liquidity. We employed among other tests time-series regressions of industries, as well as 
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specification regressions using mimicking portfolios. The results supported our 
alternative hypothesis and showed that industry clustering and liquidity characteristics 
enhance the quality of information contained in standard asset-pricing models. This 
corroborates the results of Fama and French (1997) and other researchers, stressing the 
importance of industry effects, as well as the results found by previous researchers such 
as Amihud (2002) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005), emphasizing the importance of 
liquidity. More detailed industry classifications should be incorporated in future studies 
about asset pricing. A comprehensive asset-pricing model should include industry effects 
and liquidity to provide meaningful conclusions.  
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Figure 1.1: Time Series of Key Variables 
 
This graph shows the annual averages of return, Amihud’s illiquidity (multiplied by 10) and Pastor-
Stambaugh’s liquidity factor (multiplied by 100) between 1980 and 2009.   
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Table 1.1: SIC Code List 
 
The table presents the SIC codes and corresponding industry names for the most used industries in this 
paper. Overall, we use 333 of the 526 available SIC codes during our sample time in our study. This list 
shows the SICs directly mentioned in the paper. 
 
SIC Industry 
109 Miscellaneous Metal Ores 
131 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 
148 Nonmetallic Minerals Services 
283 Drugs 
291 Petroleum Refining 
316 Luggage 
319 Leather Goods 
325 Structural Clay Products 
357 Computer and Office Equipment 
391 Jewelry, Silverware and Plated Ware 
423 Trucking Terminal Facilities 
500 Wholesale Trade, Durable Goods 
526 Retail Nurseries and Garden Stores 
549 Food Stores 
557 Motorcycle Dealers 
599 Retail Stores, Other 
703 Camps and Recreational Vehicle Parks 
791 Dance Facilities 
800 Health Services 
861 Business Associations 
872 Accounting, Auditing and Bookkeeping Services 
879 Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management and Related Services, Other 
961 Administration of General Economic Programs 
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports the basic statistics such as the average return (Amihud’s illiquidity) across SICs during 
the sample period as well as the standard deviation, skewness, maximum and minimum values. 
Furthermore, the annual averages of return, Amihud’s illiquidity (x10) and Pastor-Stambaugh’s liquidity 
factor (x100) are reported between 1980 and 2009.  
 SIC Return SIC Illiquidity 
Average across SICs  1.0%  0.18 
Std. Deviation  2.3%  0.52 
Skewness  5.30  7.07 
Maximum of a SIC 879 23.6% 148 6.10 
Minimum of a SIC 557 -6.6% 800 0.00 
 
Year Return Illiquidity PS Liquidity 
1980 4.03 2.09 -0.68 
1981 -0.79 0.83 -0.13 
1982 1.66 0.85 0.09 
1983 2.12 0.80 1.61 
1984 0.01 0.68 0.76 
1985 2.18 0.40 1.75 
1986 1.27 0.42 1.39 
1987 0.72 0.20 -4.47 
1988 1.33 0.21 1.25 
1989 2.00 0.20 0.43 
1990 -0.03 0.24 1.58 
1991 2.33 0.21 0.30 
1992 0.38 0.20 0.97 
1993 0.95 0.24 2.03 
1994 0.25 0.25 0.45 
1995 2.37 0.21 1.40 
1996 1.72 0.17 1.19 
1997 2.04 0.25 1.10 
1998 1.56 0.20 -1.23 
1999 1.08 0.14 1.36 
2000 0.14 0.13 -4.17 
2001 -0.65 0.10 2.64 
2002 -1.59 0.10 -2.48 
2003 2.27 0.11 -0.64 
2004 1.12 0.11 1.33 
2005 0.77 0.10 0.98 
2006 1.25 0.10 1.55 
2007 1.15 0.08 -0.60 
2008 -2.87 0.06 -4.37 
2009 2.38 0.07 -0.60 
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Table 1.3: Industry Clustering 
 
This table reports the five best and worst three-digit SIC industries in terms of average stock return 
according to CRSP files between 1980 and 2009. The first column displays the SIC codes of these 
industries, the second column the average returns, the third the cumulative market equity in millions of 
dollars. %ME shows the percentage market equity of the respective industries to the overall market. Worst 
LIQ (Best LIQ) reports the percentage weight of the respective industry in the worst (best) liquidity group.   
 
SIC  Return ME in Millions %ME %Best LIQ %Worst LIQ 
Best 879 23.6%  $437.46 0.00% 0.00% 0.10% 
2 703 17.4%  $1,306.12 0.01% 0.00% 0.38% 
3 423 16.9%  $1,371.27 0.01% 0.00% 0.39% 
4 791 11.9%  $5,901.97 0.04% 0.00% 1.74% 
5 549 7.0%  $26,723.44 0.17% 0.00% 5.12% 
5 319 -3.4%  $2,726.91 0.02% 0.00% 0.36% 
4 526 -3.4%  $1,796.92 0.01% 0.00% 0.53% 
3 325 -4.9%  $143,400.39 0.89% 0.03% 17.55% 
2 872 -5.2%  $46,617.46 0.29% 0.31% 0.42% 
Worst 557 -6.6%  $13,371.04 0.08% 0.00% 1.27% 
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Table 1.4: Annual Industry Clustering 
 
This table reports the annual difference in percent between the market equity of liquidity groups and 
average market equity across industries. The percentage of the category’s total market capitalization 
contained in each industry is calculated for low liquidity, high liquidity and the entire sample. The absolute 
difference in an industry’s percentage of total market capitalization is reported for each category, averaged 
over all industries each year. All p-values for the differences are below 0.001. 
Avg. Market Equity - Avg. Market Equity - High Liquidity Group - 
Low Liquidity Group High Liquidity Group Low Liquidity Group 
Year Market Equity Market Equity Market Equity 
1980 0.49% 0.78% 0.71% 
1981 0.15% 0.53% 0.68% 
1982 0.12% 0.52% 0.67% 
1983 0.13% 0.50% 0.65% 
1984 0.13% 0.52% 0.62% 
1985 0.11% 0.49% 0.62% 
1986 0.10% 0.48% 0.60% 
1987 0.09% 0.47% 0.66% 
1988 0.09% 0.47% 0.68% 
1989 0.08% 0.45% 0.64% 
1990 0.08% 0.46% 0.64% 
1991 0.07% 0.46% 0.60% 
1992 0.08% 0.45% 0.58% 
1993 0.07% 0.43% 0.52% 
1994 0.07% 0.44% 0.55% 
1995 0.06% 0.42% 0.55% 
1996 0.06% 0.42% 0.54% 
1997 0.05% 0.40% 0.53% 
1998 0.04% 0.41% 0.54% 
1999 0.04% 0.45% 0.60% 
2000 0.04% 0.45% 0.66% 
2001 0.06% 0.44% 0.60% 
2002 0.08% 0.48% 0.66% 
2003 0.06% 0.48% 0.74% 
2004 0.07% 0.47% 0.65% 
2005 0.07% 0.47% 0.62% 
2006 0.07% 0.44% 0.58% 
2007 0.07% 0.48% 0.59% 
2008 0.10% 0.49% 0.64% 
2009 0.07% 0.48% 0.65% 
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Table 1.5 – Time Series Regressions by Industry 
 
This table reports the results of four factor time-series regressions (FF3 plus momentum) for the 12 three-
digit SIC industries. The first four have the highest market equity, the next four an averagely market equity, 
the last four have the lowest market equity of our 333 industries. 
ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߛ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߜ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߠ௜ܷܯܦ௧+ߝ௜,௧ , where for each month t between 
January 1980 and December 2009 the riskfree rate is being deducted from the value-weighted return i. 
SMB, HML and UMD are the well known size, book to market and momentum factors. First, the 
coefficient for each factor is reported, then the t statistics below in italics. The average ܴଶ  of the ten 
regressions is 45.5%. *, **, ***, significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
SIC Intercept MKTRF SMB HML UMD 
Big Industries 
283 Coefficient 0.50 0.75 -0.55 -0.11 0.07 
t stat 2.60** 17.00*** -8.96*** -1.71* 1.71* 
291 Coefficient 0.20 0.80 -0.34 0.25 0.14 
t stat 0.86 14.95*** -4.65*** 3.09*** 2.88*** 
131 Coefficient 0.00 0.99 -0.08 0.45 0.09 
t stat 0.01 14.93*** -0.84 4.50*** 1.44 
357 Coefficient 0.40 0.90 0.04 -0.54 -0.29 
t stat 1.74* 16.65*** 0.54 -6.66*** -5.93*** 
Medium Industries 
391 Coefficient 0.08 1.07 0.44 0.51 -0.11 
t stat 0.15 9.42*** 2.75*** 2.95*** -1.12 
599 Coefficient 0.74 0.96 0.95 0.40 -0.28 
t stat 1.25 6.83*** 4.59*** 1.52 -1.89* 
500 Coefficient -3.47 1.08 1.98 3.16 -0.68 
t stat -1.49 1.37 2.73*** 2.54** -0.91 
109 Coefficient -0.05 1.36 0.36 0.51 0.04 
t stat -0.09 9.58*** 1.97** 2.43** 0.29 
Small Industries 
861 Coefficient 0.23 0.92 0.70 0.95 0.29 
t stat 0.10 1.54 0.73 0.85 0.34 
879 Coefficient 6.30 1.02 2.87 4.89 -6.76 
t stat 0.53 0.28 0.39 0.67 -0.74 
961 Coefficient -8.65 2.51 0.58 1.43 -0.36 
t stat -2.99*** 2.87*** 0.69 0.89 -0.26 
316 Coefficient 9.38 1.57 -4.26 -3.59 5.46 
t stat 2.13** 0.53 -1.59 -1.17 2.02** 
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Table 1.6 – Time Series Regressions by Industry with PS Liquidity 
This table reports the results of five factor time-series regressions (FF3 plus momentum and Pastor-
Stambaugh liquidity factor) for the 12 three-digit SIC industries. The first four have the highest market 
equity, the next four an averagely market equity, the last four have the lowest market equity of our 333 
industries. For each month we estimate the equation 
ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߛ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߜ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߠ௜ܷܯܦ௧ + ߟ௜ܲܵܮܫܳ௧+ߝ௜,௧, where for each month t 
between January 1980 and December 2009 the riskfree rate is being deducted from the value-weighted 
return i. SMB, HML and UMD are the well known size, book to market and momentum factors and PSLIQ 
is the Pastor Stambaugh liquidity factor. First, the coefficient for each factor is reported, then the t statistics 
below in italics. The average ܴଶ of the ten regressions is 48.9%. *, **, ***, significant at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
 
SIC Intercept MKTRF SMB HML UMD PSLIQ 
Big Industries 
283 Coefficient 0.48 0.81 -0.55 -0.09 0.07 -0.13 
t stat 2.56** 17.75*** -9.02*** -1.41 1.83* -3.98*** 
291 Coefficient 0.21 0.75 -0.35 0.23 0.14 0.10 
t stat 0.92 13.57*** -4.76*** 2.89*** 2.85*** 2.67*** 
131 Coefficient 0.01 0.95 -0.08 0.43 0.08 0.08 
t stat 0.04 13.76*** -0.89 4.35*** 1.41 1.68* 
357 Coefficient 0.40 0.92 0.04 -0.53 -0.29 -0.05 
t stat 1.71* 16.29*** 0.58 -6.53*** -5.91*** -1.34 
Medium Industries 
391 Coefficient 0.13 0.95 0.42 0.46 -0.12 0.27 
t stat 0.27 8.05*** 2.71*** 2.71*** -1.22 3.33*** 
599 Coefficient 0.77 1.09 0.98 0.43 -0.23 -0.30 
t stat 1.32 7.41*** 4.77*** 1.68* -1.60 -2.69*** 
500 Coefficient -3.77 1.11 1.80 3.07 -0.48 0.29 
t stat -1.57 1.39 2.32** 2.43** -0.59 0.68 
109 Coefficient -0.06 1.37 0.36 0.51 0.03 -0.03 
t stat -0.10 9.08*** 1.98** 2.45** 0.27 -0.30 
Small Industries 
861 Coefficient 0.14 0.92 0.73 0.92 0.31 0.13 
t stat 0.05 1.51 0.75 0.79 0.36 0.19 
879 Coefficient 8.11 0.16 1.60 4.04 -8.74 2.03 
t stat 0.63 0.04 0.20 0.51 -0.86 0.66 
961 Coefficient -8.20 1.96 0.63 0.92 0.00 0.59 
t stat -2.96*** 2.11** 0.80 0.59 0.00 1.35 
316 Coefficient 6.29 -2.34 -1.49 -0.27 4.25 -1.38 
t stat 1.20 -0.50 -0.40 -0.06 1.46 -1.07 
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Table 1.7 – Time Series Regressions by Industry with Amihud’s Illiquidity 
This table reports the results of five factor time-series regressions (FF3 plus momentum and Pastor-
Stambaugh liquidity factor) for the 12 three-digit SIC industries. The first four have the highest market 
equity, the next four an averagely market equity, the last four have the lowest market equity of our 333 
industries. The estimated model is 
 ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߛ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߜ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߠ௜ܷܯܦ௧ + ߟ௜ܫܮܫܳ௧+ߝ௜,௧, where for each month t 
between January 1980 and December 2009 the riskfree rate is being deducted from the value-weighted 
return i. SMB, HML and UMD are the well known size, book to market and momentum factors and ILIQ is 
the Amihud’s Illiquidity factor. First, the coefficient for each factor is reported, then the t statistics below in 
italics. The average ܴଶ of the ten regressions is 50.7%. *, **, ***, significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
SIC Intercept MKTRF SMB HML UMD ILIQ 
Big Industries 
283 Coefficient 0.51 0.76 -0.60 -0.13 0.08 -0.07 
t stat 2.65*** 16.14*** -6.09*** -1.81* 1.81* -0.60 
291 Coefficient 0.25 0.84 -0.53 0.20 0.17 -0.29 
t stat 1.09 14.79*** -4.51*** 2.36** 3.40*** -2.03** 
131 Coefficient 0.01 1.00 -0.11 0.44 0.09 -0.05 
t stat 0.04 14.07*** -0.73 4.21*** 1.44 -0.26 
357 Coefficient 0.36 0.87 0.19 -0.50 -0.31 0.24 
t stat 1.54 15.09*** 1.60 -5.88*** -6.14*** 1.61 
Medium Industries 
391 Coefficient 0.14 1.10 0.29 0.47 -0.09 -0.23 
t stat 0.27 9.06*** 1.15 2.60*** -0.82 -0.73 
599 Coefficient 0.76 0.98 0.87 0.37 -0.26 -0.12 
t stat 1.28 6.59*** 2.75*** 1.34 -1.69* -0.31 
500 Coefficient -4.88 2.01 -0.18 2.34 -0.74 -3.72 
t stat -2.09** 2.24** -0.13 1.87* -1.05 -1.88* 
109 Coefficient 0.00 1.39 0.17 0.45 0.07 -0.29 
t stat 0.01 9.40*** 0.60 2.05** 0.52 -0.82 
Small Industries 
861 Coefficient 1.21 2.19 -3.50 -0.15 0.21 -5.33 
t stat 0.56 3.30*** -2.22** -0.14 0.28 -3.13*** 
879 Coefficient 4.36 1.01 7.43 8.42 -4.42 4.53 
t stat 0.30 0.25 0.43 0.59 -0.35 0.30 
961 Coefficient -10.46 2.47 4.39 3.99 -0.66 5.82 
t stat -4.02*** 3.34*** 2.20** 2.16** -0.56 2.04** 
316 Coefficient 5.55 0.95 -5.39 -3.36 5.60 -3.15 
t stat 0.73 0.29 -1.62 -1.04 1.97** -0.63 
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Table 1.8 – Mimicking Portfolios  
This table reports the average illiquidity values of very liquid and very illiquid portfolios across industries 
as well as portfolios across the same industries mimicking these portfolios. For the purpose of mimicking 
industry clustering in the very liquid portfolio, only firms that are not in the very liquid portfolio are 
selected. Likewise, only “non-least liquid” portfolios are selected for mimicking industry clustering in the 
least liquid portfolio. Firms in the random trials are chosen such that the total market capitalization of each 
industry in the trial portfolio is proportional to the market capitalization of that industry in the respective 
hedge, most liquid, or least liquid portfolio.  
 
Illiquidity 
Least Liquid Stocks 2.23 
Mimic least liquid stocks 0.08 
Most liquid stocks 0.001 
Mimic most liquid stocks 0.42 
 
p-value for difference test between mimicking portfolios is less than 0.0001 for illiquidity. The difference 
in differences test between extreme and mimicking portfolios has a p-value of less than 0.0001. 
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Table 1.9 – Specification Regressions on Mimicking Portfolios 
The numbers in each row represent the percentage of the 250 random trials that reject the null hypothesis of 
zero mean monthly abnormal return at theoretical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis of the intercept being significantly negative on the left tail, or significantly positive 
on the right tail. Long-run abnormal returns are measured by the regression intercept using the four-factor 
model. Excess returns are regressed on RMRF, SMB, HML, and UMD. First, portfolio returns which are 
long in mimicking least liquid stocks and short in mimicking most liquid stocks are used, then mimicking 
least (most) liquid stocks are employed. *, **, ***, significantly different from the theoretical rejection rate 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Theoretical Rejection Rates 
 10% 5% 1% 
 Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail 
 5% 95% 2.50% 97.50% 0.50% 99.50% 
Hedge portfolio 21.2%*** 38.8%*** 17.2%*** 36.8%*** 13.6%*** 28%*** 
Mimic most liquid 0.00% 100%*** 0.00% 100%*** 0.00% 100%*** 
Mimic least liquid 0.00% 100%*** 0.00% 99.6%*** 0.00% 98.8%*** 
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Table 1.10 – Alternative Regressions 
This table reports the results of four factor time-series regressions (FF3 plus momentum). 
ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߛ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߛ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߠ௜ܷܯܦ௧+ߝ௜,௧ , where for each month t between 
January 1980 and December 2009 the riskfree rate is being deducted from the value-weighted return i. 
SMB, HML and UMD are the well known size, book to market and momentum factors. First, the 
coefficient for each factor is reported, then the t statistics below in italics. In Panel A, a hedge portfolio 
long in most liquid stocks and short in least liquid stocks is used as a dependent variable, where the stocks 
are weighted according to their relative weight in their industry in the total market. In Panel B, a hedge 
portfolio long in stocks mimicking most liquid stocks and short in stocks mimicking least liquid stocks is 
used as a dependent variable, where the stocks are weighted according to the weights of the most and least 
liquid stocks, respectively. *, **, ***, significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  
Intercept MKTRF SMB HML UMD 
Coefficient -0.01 -0.12 0.85 0.08 -0.18 
t stat -2.53*** -2.61*** 12.79*** 1.15 -4.17*** 
Panel B: 
Intercept MKTRF SMB HML UMD 
Coefficient 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.04 0.05 
t stat -0.17 0.51 -7.59*** 3.56*** 7.40*** 
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CHAPTER 2: GOVERNANCE AND LIQUIDITY IN ASSET PRICING 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance has attracted a lot of attention from academics and 
practitioners in recent decades, since investors are more mature in their demands of good 
management of their investments. Investor activism has increased following corporate 
scandals from companies such as Enron, WorldCom, and later the financial crisis. A good 
deal of research has been made to determine the impact of governance on firm 
performance (See Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003).7 Recently, researchers looked more 
intensely at the relation of governance and liquidity. Subrahmanyam (2007), for example, 
found evidence that liquidity is inversely related to governance; i.e., more liquid stocks 
are poorly governed. He argued that short-term speculators are not interested in the long-
term prospects of a company and therefore disregard corporate governance issues. On the 
other hand, Norli, Ostergaard and Schindele (2010) showed that liquidity enhances the 
incentive to monitor management. The more liquid a stock is, the more likely it is that 
shareholder activism is taking place. We jointly examine liquidity and governance to see: 
(1) if both factors command a premium, and (2) if one factor dominates the other. Our 
contribution to the literature is to reestablish the importance of each factor in asset pricing 
in the light of recent studies that have indicated dwindling governance and liquidity 
premia. Furthermore, we show the interconnection of both factors in the asset-pricing 
paradigm. 
                                                             
7 See also Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009), La Porta et al. (2000) and Daines (2001), as well as others 
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In our first step, we examine the abnormal returns of portfolios sorted on 
Amihud’s Illiquidity, the G or E index as proxies for liquidity and governance, 
respectively. Our benchmark model is the four-factor model—the Fama-French (1993) 
three-factor model as enhanced by Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor. Thereby, we 
corroborate the importance of liquidity and governance, despite the recent results by Core, 
Guay and Rusticus (2006), and Ben-Rephael, Kadan and Wohl (2010). Extant literature 
shows liquidity of a stock is priced (See Amihud and Mendelson (1986), and Amihud 
(2002))8 and we find evidence to support a priced liquidity risk as well. Then we double-
sort our portfolios on liquidity and governance independently and dependently 9  to 
establish whether or not one factor is dominating the other—liquidity, especially, may 
dominate governance. Corporate governance characteristics are potentially a proxy for 
information asymmetry that may be better captured by the market liquidity of a 
company’s shares. Our main results show, however, that governance characteristics are 
important in their own right or could be capturing some still unknown kind of risk. 
Afterwards, we look into the clustering of liquidity in the 10 G or 6 E index portfolios. 
Additionally, we examine governance clustering of liquidity annually. The results 
confirm clustering, but the clustering is unsystematic. Finally, we adopt a methodology 
by Johnson, Moorman and Sorescu (2009) and create mimicking portfolios that emulate 
the clustering of liquidity in the best and worst governance portfolios, as well as 
portfolios that mimic the clustering of governance in the best and worst liquidity 
portfolios (but do not consist of these extreme portfolios). Then we take these mimicking 
                                                             
8 See also Chan and Faff (2005), and Datar, Naik and Radcliffe (1998)  
9 First we sort the portfolios into five liquidity groups and afterwards each liquidity group into five 
governance groups.  
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portfolios and run 250 specification regressions to see whether the factors themselves are 
priced or only their clustering in certain portfolios. The results confirm the earlier results 
in two ways. First, they show that clustering is present, but that, second, neither factor 
dominates the other—all of which supports our alternative hypothesis. Hence, we 
conclude that the results found in previous studies by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), 
as well as by Amihud (2002), are still valid today. 
Section 2.2 provides a brief overview of the literature, Section 2.3 follows with 
the data and methodology used in this study, Section 2.4 continues with the results and 
Section 2.5 concludes our study. 
2.2 Literature Review and Development of Hypothesis 
We focus on three strands of literature for our study, namely: (1) governance 
premium, (2) liquidity premium, and (3) joint role of liquidity and governance in asset 
pricing paradigms. Corporate governance shapes the rules between investors and 
managers. Before the 1980s these rules were stable, but since then many companies have 
adopted new rules that vary significantly across firms.  
The literature cited below establishes the crucial nature of anti-takeover measures 
that can be implemented either by state laws or by the company itself in a company’s 
governance practices—corporate by-laws. Borokhovich, Brunarski and Parrino (1997) 
found that remuneration rises for CEOs of firms that implement takeover defenses. 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999a, 1999b, and 2000) showed similar results for firms 
being covered by state takeover laws. Several studies have shown that there is a relation 
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between corporate governance laws and the firm’s value. La Porta et al. (2000) found that 
the rights of minority shareholders are positively correlated with the firm’s value. Daines 
(2001) showed that Delaware firms had higher stock values than other U.S. firms.  
Later, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) constructed a Governance index (G) 
comprised of 28 corporate governance provisions, condensed into 24 distinctive measures 
in 5 categories, including: state laws, tactics for delaying hostile bidders, manager 
protection, voting rights, and other takeover defenses. This index from Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) publications should proxy the differences in the 
relationships between investors and their agents to analyze corporate performance during 
the 1990s. They found a strong correlation of G values with stock returns where a high G 
value corresponds to bad governance and low G value to good governance. An 
investment strategy of buying shares in the firms with strong shareholder rights, and 
selling shares in firms with weak shareholder rights, earns excess returns of 8.5% 
annually. On the other hand, Johnson, Moorman and Sorescu (2009) attributed the 
findings of Gompers et al. to industry clustering. The excess returns found by Gompers et 
al. are due to some industries outperforming others. Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) 
showed that the governance premium is time-sensitive; after 2000, the premium vanishes. 
The entrenchment index compiled by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) used 
only six provisions out of the 24 as listed above—four constitutional and two takeover-
readiness provisions. According to their research, the above factors are enough to drive 
the results found for the G index. Their results showed that higher levels of their index 
(entrenchment index or E index) are related to significant reductions in Tobin’s Q as a 
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proxy for company valuation. Cremers and Nair (2005) found a range of mechanisms on 
the firm level connected to governance. These mechanisms can be divided into two 
categories: external and internal governance mechanisms. “External” governance means 
primarily the presence of anti-takeover provisions, whereas “internal” governance refers 
to block holders. Shareholders with a significant amount of shares have an incentive to 
monitor firm management more closely and facilitate takeovers (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986). On the contrary, Jensen (1993) stated that many internal control mechanisms 
failed during the 1970s and 1980s. 
So far the literature has found overwhelming evidence for liquidity to be a price 
factor. Liquidity means the ease to turn a financial asset into cash with little or no 
discount. Thus, stocks with low liquidity should have returns, including a premium for 
their liquidity risks. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) used the bid-ask spread to study the 
impact of liquidity in asset pricing. They discovered that there is a negative relationship 
between expected returns of stocks and liquidity. In later years the bid-ask spread was 
found to be an imperfect measure for liquidity. Therefore, researchers began to use 
different kinds of measures, such as turnover ratio (Chan and Faff, 2005; Datar, Naik, & 
Radcliffe, 1998), the illiquidity ratio (Amihud, 2002), and trading volume (Brennan, 
Chordia, & Subrahmanyam, 1998) to investigate liquidity issues. Amihud (2002) found 
evidence that illiquidity risk is priced in the market over time. This leads to the 
conclusion that market risk premium also includes illiquidity risk. Furthermore, he found 
that illiquidity has a greater effect on small firm stocks, thus potentially capturing the 
adverse selection associated with such firms that leads to higher stock returns for small 
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firms. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) found that high liquidity is related to higher stock 
returns and that liquidity risk and momentum risk are connected. More recently, Liu 
(2006) developed a new asset-pricing model based on market risk and liquidity risk that 
outperforms the Fama-French three-factor model. Similarly, Nguyen, Mishra, Prakash 
and Ghosh (2007) found that the Fama-French three-factor model is not able to capture 
liquidity effects. Their analysis showed that stock characteristics are not good proxies for 
liquidity either.  
Recent studies have looked into the linkage between governance and liquidity but 
have come to different conclusions. Norli, Ostergaard and Schindele (2010) mentioned 
that liquidity enhances the incentive to monitor management. The more liquid a stock is, 
the more likely it is that shareholder activism is taking place. Furthermore, Chen et al. 
(2007) argued that firms that are disclosing less information would suffer higher 
information asymmetry; in fact, an analysis of the effective spread corroborates that. 
Similarly, Chung et al. (2010) investigated governance, bid-ask spreads, as well as the 
market quality index and probability of information-based trading. They too found that 
well-governed firms are more likely to have liquid stock. 
In view of the extant literature cited above on governance and liquidity, the goal 
of our study is to shed light on the linkage of these variables in a rigorous set of asset 
pricing tests. Our first null hypothesis states that liquidity is not priced, while our second 
null hypothesis states that governance is not a priced factor anymore. Lastly, we 
hypothesize that liquidity dominates governance. Alternatively, both factors—adverse 
selection and governance—are still priced and neither factor dominates the other. 
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 Our study contributes to the literature by presenting evidence in support of the 
alternative hypotheses. These findings especially support Amihud (2002), and Gompers, 
Ishii and Metrick (2003). 
2.3. Data and Methodology 
 The sample data consists of all NYSE companies included in the CRSP database 
from 1990 to 2006. Utility companies and financial companies were excluded due to their 
highly regulated legal environment. Firm-months were kept as though they had a positive 
trading volume, share price and shares outstanding. The governance index was obtained 
from Metrick’s homepage and merged with the CRSP dataset. We also used the 
entrenchment index compiled by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) obtained from 
Bebchuk’s homepage for robustness. The governance dataset is constrained by the 
availability of the governance index, which is only available for years after 1990, when 
the IRRC first released the data that later was compiled to obtain the governance index. It 
consists of the ticker symbol and index value from 1990 to 2006. Following common 
practice, we retained the value of the index until a new index value was available. We 
used the monthly version of Amihud’s Illiquidity as a proxy for liquidity: 
ܫܮܮܫܳ௜௠ = 1/ܦ௜௠ ∑ |ܴ௜௠|/ܸܱܮܦ௜௠ௗ஽೔೘௧ୀଵ                                                                           (1)       
                                                                     
where ܦ௜௠ is the number of daily observations for stock i in month m; ܴ௜௠ is the daily 
return of stock i in month m; and ܸܱܮܦ௜௠ௗ is the daily volume of stock i in month m. We 
then standardized the measure by dividing it by the market-wide illiquidity of each month 
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m. Our dataset contains 1,427 companies, ranging from 590 companies in 1990 to 733 in 
2006, with a maximum of 837 in 1998.10  
First, we analyzed all of the variables of interest separately to determine if it was 
sensible to conduct multivariate tests. Hence, we examined how well the Fama-French 
three-factors and Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor are able to explain returns of stock 
portfolios sorted on either of our variables: illiquidity, G index, and E index. This 
analysis enabled us to detect any additional information that these variables might add to 
the known risk factors. We adopted the GRS test statistic suggested by Gibbons, Ross 
and Shanken (1989) to determine whether or not the intercepts jointly equal zero for the 
four-factor model. Additionally, we provided the Sharpe ratio alpha as suggested by 
Lewellen, Nagel and Shanken (2010). We then sorted the sample companies into five 
(three) groups or portfolios based on their illiquidity, or G (E) index separately. The 
number of portfolios depended on the range of the variable. Then the excess returns of 
the companies were regressed on the four factors as follows:  
ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߛ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߜ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߠ௜ܴܲ1ܻܴ௧ + ߝ௜,௧                     (2) 
 
 where r୧,୲ − r୤,୲ is the excess return of portfolio i in year t, and ൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯, ܵܯܤ௧,
ܪܯܮ௧are the Fama and French (1993) factors related to market premium, firm size, and 
the book-to-market ratio in year t. ܴܲ1ܻܴ௧ is Carhart’s momentum factor. In time-series 
regressions, a well-specified asset-pricing model that is not overly affected by 
                                                             
10 The dataset is constrained by the few companies available in the G and E indices, and the results of 
merging these datasets together with our illiquidity data and applying conventional restrictions, such as 
excluding utilities, financial companies, penny stocks and winsorizing.  
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multicollinearity or endogeneity creates intercepts that are not different from zero, 
according to Merton (1973) and Fama and French (1993). 
 After we established that the single characteristics are of importance in the asset-
pricing paradigm, we investigated the joint importance of these characteristics. Therefore, 
we double sorted the data into several portfolios according to governance and liquidity 
characteristics, and ran several time series analyses of stock return portfolios, controlling 
for the four factors described above.  
 We conducted the above double sorting in two ways: with independent and 
dependent sorts. First, we sorted each characteristic independently from one another. For 
the dependent sort, we first sorted it according to liquidity, and then sorted each liquidity 
portfolio into several governance portfolios.  
The next step consisted of investigating the concentration of liquidity in the 10 G 
index portfolios11. The portfolios are sorted according to the annual average excess return. 
We examined the percentage of high and low liquidity groups in the 10 G index 
portfolios as well as the average percentage market equity, the average illiquidity, and the 
average Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity in each G index portfolio. We conducted the same 
procedure using the 6 E index portfolios (combing the last two E index values). 
Afterwards, we analyzed the annual G index clustering. We calculated the annual 
percentage difference between the market equity of liquidity groups and the average 
market equity of G index groups. The percentage of the category’s total market 
                                                             
11 We combined all companies with an index value of less than or equal to 5 in one portfolio. We did the 
same for all companies with index values higher or equal to 14 into one portfolio. This is similar to Johnson 
et al. (2009). 
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capitalization contained in each G index value was calculated for low illiquidity, high 
illiquidity and the entire sample. The absolute difference in a G index’s percentage of 
total market capitalization is reported for each category, averaged over all G index values 
each year.  Then we conducted the same procedure using the 6 E index portfolios. 
Finally, we created mimicking portfolios similar to Johnson et al. (2009) and used 
these portfolios in specification regressions. For the purpose of mimicking G index 
clustering in the very liquid portfolio, only firms that are not in the very liquid portfolio 
were selected. Likewise, only “non-least liquid” firms were selected for mimicking G 
index clustering in the least liquid portfolio. Firms in the random trials were chosen in 
such a way that the total market capitalization of each G index value in the trial portfolio 
was proportional to the market capitalization of that G in the respective hedge, least 
liquid, or most liquid portfolio. Moreover, we reversed the procedure and selected only 
non-democratic and non-dictatorial companies to mimic democratic and dictatorial 
companies, respectively. The companies were chosen in such a way that the liquidity 
clustering of the democratic or dictatorial portfolio was preserved. We then ran 250 
random trials to test the hypothesis of zero mean monthly abnormal returns at theoretical 
significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Long-run abnormal returns were 
measured by the regression intercept using the four-factor model. Once this was 
completed, we then conducted the same procedure using the E index instead of the G 
index. These procedures allowed us to detect any clustering of liquidity or governance in 
sorted portfolios and to conclude whether market liquidity or corporate governance 
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dominates the other. In other words, we were able to see whether the model was well 
specified or not. 
2.4. Results 
  In Table 2.1, we present the summary statistics of the data used in this study, and 
in Table 2.2 the simple coefficients of correlation between the key variables. Our dataset 
contains 1,427 companies and the median value for the governance index is 10. The 
entrenchment index is 3 and for illiquidity it is 0.009. The means are higher, with 9.79, 
2.55 and 0.04, respectively, indicating positive skewness (see Table 2.1, Panel A). Panel 
B of Table 2.1 shows the development of these measures and excess returns, and Pastor-
Stambaugh’s liquidity factor (that we used in later analyses) over time. The G and E 
indices are stable over time with a dip towards democracy in later years. Amihud’s 
Illiquidity decreases starkly to 0.18 from 0.71, highlighting the increasing liquidity in the 
U.S. stock market in the last several decades. Pastor-Stambaugh’s liquidity factor 
displays no significant trend, although it is much more volatile in the second half of our 
sample time (see also Figure 2.1). 
Table 2.2 displays the correlation among our three key variables. Besides the 
expected high correlation (0.74) between the two proxies for governance, all correlations 
are significantly different from each other with all p-values being less than 0.0001. The 
correlation between illiquidity and governance is negative, as expected. The correlation 
between the G index and illiquidity is -0.06 and the value for the E index and illiquidity is 
-0.02.  
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Table 2.3 reports the value of the intercepts obtained in four-factor model 
regressions for five portfolios of NYSE stocks sorted either by illiquidity or the G index, 
respectively. For the entrenchment index, only three portfolios were used due to the small 
range of this variable (0-6). Portfolios were formed annually from 1990 to 2006. Table 
2.3 presents intercepts from the time series regression of the three-factor model as 
expressed in the following equation: 
ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߛ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߜ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߠ௜ܴܲ1ܻܴ௧ + ߝ௜,௧                     (2) 
 
Panel A presents the results for illiquidity-sorted portfolios. The portfolio with the 
lowest illiquidity has an abnormal return of 0.11 and a t statistic of 1.47. The abnormal 
returns show that the least liquid portfolio commands a positive premium. The portfolio 
with the lowest liquidity has an abnormal return of 0.36 and a t statistic of 2.47. This 
corroborates the results of researchers like Amihud (2002) in showing that standard asset-
pricing models cannot account for liquidity effects and that non-liquid stocks command a 
premium. The portfolios are sorted according to the G and E index in Panels B and C, 
respectively. In both cases, the most democratic portfolio has the highest alpha. The less 
democratic the portfolio, the more likely it is negative (although insignificantly so). 
Additionally, we conduct the GRS test to determine if the intercepts are jointly zero. We 
can reject that in all three cases at the 1% level (The F value is 16.53, 4.86 and 4.94, 
respectively). This indicates that all three factors add value to the regressions. They 
convey information beyond the three well-known Fama-French and momentum risk 
factors. The barely significant governance results also corroborate results of Core et al. 
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(2006), which showed that the G index was more successful in the 1990s and loses 
explanatory power when later years are added. 
The first pass results are encouraging and provide the basis for conducting the 
joint test of importance for governance and liquidity characteristics. Table 2.4 reports the 
value of the intercepts obtained from the four-factor model regressions for 25 portfolios 
of NYSE stocks sorted by illiquidity and the governance index. The illiquidity increases 
across groups. The first panel shows the results when we sorted both groups 
independently. Panel B is sorted dependently, first based on illiquidity, then on the G 
index. Both panels show that the least liquid portfolio commands a positive premium. 
The same is true for the democratic portfolio. The GRS-tests confirms the overall 
significance of the intercepts with an F-value of 8.43 in Panel A, and 9.84 in Panel B 
(both significant at the 1% level). The results indicate that both governance and liquidity 
play an important role in asset pricing and that neither factor dominates the other. Table 
2.5 presents the results of the intercepts obtained by 15 portfolios sorted based on 
illiquidity and the E index in the same manner as Table 2.4. The results again show 
positive abnormal returns for the democratic portfolio and the least liquid group. The 
GRS-tests confirm the overall significance of the intercepts with an F-value of 9.92 in 
Panel A, and 10.21 in Panel B (both significant at the 1% level). The findings show the 
importance of both factors, although it is still unclear how these factors interact with one 
another. Therefore, we examine with more intensity whether or not liquidity is clustered 
in governance portfolios. 
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Hence, we investigated the possible clustering of liquidity in each G index value. 
We sorted each G value from high to low average annual excess return. Then we 
calculated the relative market equity of the companies within each G portfolio and the 
relative market equity of the 30% stocks with the highest and lowest liquidity. 
Additionally, we presented the average illiquidity and Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor 
for each G portfolio. The excess returns ranged from 0.93% to 0.39% with no clear 
pattern of either increasing or decreasing democracy (see Table 2.6). The range was from 
0.71% to 0.37% for the E index. Again, no clear pattern of either increasing or decreasing 
democracy was detectable. G index 9 had the highest market share, with 13.4% of overall 
market equity, while 14 only had 4%. G index 6 with 0.93% return had 8.3% market 
equity of the companies with the lowest liquidity, less than the 12.5% it had in the 
portfolio with the most liquid companies. Overall, though, no bias was visible. The 
average illiquidity and PS liquidity is not biased towards the high, nor low, G index. For 
the E index, both the low liquidity for the most dictatorial portfolio and the high liquidity 
for the most democratic portfolio are of special interest, as well as the low market share 
of the most dictatorial portfolio. 
But Table 2.7 reveals that the annual difference in percentage between the market 
equity of low or high liquidity groups, and the average market equity of G index groups 
is highly significant along with the difference between liquidity groups. All p-values for 
the difference in the means test are less than 1%. This clearly indicates clustering in 
governance portfolios. For the high liquidity portfolio, the difference is fairly constant at 
above 1%, but in the late 90s it takes a slight dip. The low liquidity portfolio difference is 
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much higher over time at just below 10% with lows in 1991 and 1995 but similarly stable. 
Therefore, the difference between low and high liquidity is usually around 8%, with 
slightly lower values in the first few years. Overall, this table shows that liquidity is not 
evenly distributed across governance portfolios over time. We conduct further analyses to 
determine whether or not this bias is systematic. 
Therefore, we conducted specification regressions using mimicking portfolios. 
For the purpose of mimicking G index clustering in the least liquid portfolio, only firms 
that were not in the least liquid portfolio were selected. Likewise, only firms that were 
not in the “most liquid” portfolios were selected for mimicking G index clustering in the 
most liquid portfolio. Least liquid stocks have an average illiquidity of 0.28—much 
higher than the nearly zero for the most liquid (see Table 2.8). The mimicking portfolios 
have an average of 0.02 and 0.04, respectively, representing a much less significant 
difference than the original portfolios, according to the difference in the differences test. 
We then conducted the reverse procedure with the governance index, in which the 
democratic stocks had an average G value of 4.6. The mimicking stocks had an average 
G value of 10.1, whereas the dictatorial stocks and the stocks emulating the liquidity 
profile of dictatorial stocks had an average of 14.5 and 9.2, respectively. The results for 
the E index were almost unchanged for illiquidity. The most democratic portfolio was 
zero by construction, whereas the dictatorial stocks had an average E index value of 5.1. 
The mimicking portfolios were 2.74 and 2.41, respectively. Again the difference of 
mimicking portfolios is significantly less than the difference of the original portfolios, 
thus indicating the fact that the mimicking portfolios are neutral with respect to 
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governance and liquidity, respectively. In the next step, we used the mimicking portfolios 
to conduct specification regressions to determine whether or not the four-factor model 
could explain the returns of these portfolios. In Panel A of Table 2.9, we find that the 
portfolio returns, which are long in mimicking most liquid stocks and short in mimicking 
least liquid stocks, are overly distributed on both tails. The most liquid and least liquid 
portfolio is overly rejected on the right tail. For the G index the hedge portfolio is again 
overly rejected on both tails, whereas the democratic and dictatorial stocks emulating 
portfolios are rejected overly on the right tails only. The results for the E index in Panels 
C and D are very similar to the G index results. In sum, this leads to the conclusion that 
both factors are contributing significantly to asset-pricing models and neither dominates 
the other, although they are influenced by each other. Overall, the tests present clear 
evidence in support of the alternative hypotheses that liquidity and governance still 
matter. 
2.5. Conclusion 
 Studies by Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) and Ben-Rephael, Kadan and Wohl 
(2010) found that governance and liquidity premia have been dwindling in the last few 
years. Governance characteristics are potentially a proxy for information asymmetry that 
may be better captured by the market liquidity of a company’s shares. We performed 
several standard asset-pricing tests to show the joint effect of governance and liquidity on 
the asset-pricing paradigm. We confirmed in several time-series analyses of portfolios 
(which are sorted according to liquidity and governance) that they are priced factors. This 
corroborates the results of Amihud (2002) and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). 
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Further analysis revealed that liquidity is clustered in the governance-sorted portfolio, but 
specification regressions of portfolios mimicking liquidity or governance clustering in the 
extreme portfolios show that this clustering is unsystematic.  
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Figure 2.1: Time Series of Key Variables 
Figure 2.1a shows the annual mean of governance index and entrenchment index. Figure 2.1b shows the 
annual mean of Amihud’s illiquidity (times100) and Pastor-Stambaugh’s liquidity factor. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics. Mean, median and standard deviation of the variables used in the 
later sections are shown in panel A. Illiquidity is defined as the daily average absolute return over trading 
volume for each month. The governance index is taken from Metrick’s website and the entrenchment index 
from Bebchuk’s website. Panel B shows the annual averages of the five key variables (Illiquidity: times 
100).  
Panel A: 
 G Index E Index Illiquidity 
    
25% quartile 8 2 0.003 
Median value 10 3 0.009 
75% quartile 12 4 0.032 
Mean value 9.79 2.55 0.04 
St. Dev. 2.66 1.30 0.10 
 
Panel B: 
Year Excess Return G Index E Index Illiquidity PS LiQ 
1990 -0.05% 9.41 2.04 0.71 0.03 
1991 1.81% 9.39 2.03 0.65 -0.38 
1992 0.25% 9.33 2.02 0.55 -0.96 
1993 0.47% 9.43 1.99 0.53 0.27 
1994 0.00% 9.41 1.99 0.52 -1.80 
1995 2.07% 9.31 1.95 0.49 -0.26 
1996 1.19% 9.31 1.94 0.45 -0.03 
1997 1.88% 9.27 1.91 0.37 -2.31 
1998 1.65% 9.28 1.91 0.42 -6.07 
1999 0.56% 9.15 1.84 0.35 1.17 
2000 -0.41% 9.24 1.79 0.36 -7.13 
2001 -0.87% 9.37 1.83 0.29 -2.07 
2002 -1.70% 9.19 1.93 0.28 -8.08 
2003 1.88% 9.15 1.94 0.29 -4.00 
2004 0.94% 9.00 1.87 0.25 -2.08 
2005 0.41% 8.99 1.89 0.20 -1.19 
2006 0.84% 8.88 1.75 0.18 -1.64 
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Table 2.2: Simple Correlations 
This table reports time series averages of annual cross-sectional correlation of variables in asset pricing 
tests for all NYSE stocks over the period 1990-2006. Illiquidity is defined as the daily average absolute 
return over trading volume for each year. The governance index is taken from Metrick’s website and the 
entrenchment index from Bebchuk’s website. All correlations have p values that are less than 0.0001. 
 
G Index E Index Illiquidity 
G Index 1.00 0.72 -0.06 
E Index 0.72 1.00 -0.02 
Illiquidity -0.06 -0.02 1.00 
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Table 2.3: Single Sorted Time Series Regressions 
This table reports the value of the intercepts obtained in three-factor model for five portfolios of NYSE 
stocks sorted by Amihud’s illiquidity. For the entrenchment index only three portfolios were used, for the 
governance index five. Illiquidity is defined as the daily average absolute return over trading volume for 
each year. Portfolios are formed yearly for the period 1990-2005. Panel A presents intercepts from the time 
series regression of three-factor model as in the following equation  ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ +
ߛ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߜ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߬௜ܷܯܦ௧ + ߝ௜,௧ ,  where ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ is the excess return on portfolio i in year t, and 
൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯, ܪܯܮ௧, ܵܯܤ௧, are the Fama and French (1993) factors related to market premium, the book-
to-market ratio and the firm size in year t and ܷܯܦ௧is Carhart’s momentum factor. The portfolios are 
sorted from lowest to highest levels of illiquidity. In Panel B they are sorted from most democratic to 
dictatorial according to the G index. Panel C presents the intercepts from sorting from most democratic to 
dictatorial according to the E index. The bottom of each panel presents the Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) 
test of the hypothesis that the intercepts jointly equal zero for the four-factor model. Intercepts are reported 
in absolute terms (t-statistics are in italics). 
Panel A: Sorted by Amihud's illiquidity 
1 2 3 4 5 
0.11 0.06 0.02 0.20 0.36 
1.47 0.47 0.11 1.25 2.46 
F-value for Gibbons, Ross, Shanken, test that the intercepts jointly equal to zero is 
3.75*** (significant at 1 percent level) SR(α): 0.33 
Panel B: Sorted by governance index 
1 2 3 4 5 
0.30 0.25 0.01 -0.03 0.02 
2.15 2.16 0.05 -0.27 0.12 
F-value for Gibbons, Ross, Shanken, test that the intercepts jointly equal to zero is 
6.23*** (significant at 1 percent level) SR(α): 0.42 
Panel C: Sorted by entrenchment index 
1   2   3 
0.12 0.12 -0.05 
1.37   1.39   -0.40 
F-value for Gibbons, Ross, Shanken, test that the intercepts jointly equal to zero is 
13.37*** (significant at 1 percent level) SR(α): 0.48 
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Table 2.4: Double Sorted Time Series Regressions – G Index 
 
This table reports the value of the intercepts obtained in three-factor model for 25 portfolios of NYSE 
stocks sorted by illiquidity and governance index. Illiquidity is defined as the daily average absolute return 
over trading volume for each year.  Portfolios are formed yearly for the period 1990-2006. Panel A presents 
intercepts from the time series regression of three-factor model as in the following equation ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ =
ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߛ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߜ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߝ௜,௧,  where ݎ௜,௧  − ݎ௙,௧is the excess return on portfolio i in year 
t, and ൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯, ܪܯܮ௧, ܵܯܤ௧, are the Fama and French (1993) factors related to market premium, the 
book-to-market ratio and the firm size in year t. In Panel A, the portfolios are sorted independently. 
Portfolio 1,1 has the least illiquidity and is democratic. Panel B presents the portfolios sorted dependently. 
The bottom of each panel presents the Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test of the hypothesis that the 
intercepts jointly equal zero for the four-factor model. Intercepts are reported in absolute terms (t-statistics 
are in italics). 
 
Panel A: Sorted independently 
Illiquidity groups 
1 2 3 4 5 
G index 1 0.34 0.07 0.18 0.12 0.27 
2.17 0.28 0.68 0.53 1.21 
groups 2 0.27 0.19 0.16 0.31 0.80 
1.93 0.91 0.79 1.49 3.80 
3 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.26 0.18 
0.15 -0.02 -0.06 1.36 1.04 
4 -0.05 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.48 
-0.34 0.20 0.32 0.75 2.19 
5 0.07 -0.10 -0.26 0.00 0.05 
0.37 -0.58 -1.26 -0.02 0.24 
F-value for Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test that the intercepts jointly equal to zero is 
8.43*** (significant at 1 percent level) SR(α): 1.16 
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Panel B: Sorted dependently 
Illiquidity groups 
1 2 3 4 5 
G index 1 0.32 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.36 
2.99 0.83 0.79 0.78 1.65 
groups 2 0.00 -0.12 0.22 0.39 0.63 
-0.02 -0.63 1.17 1.93 2.88 
3 0.08 -0.05 -0.20 0.24 0.43 
0.47 -0.27 -1.03 1.12 2.14 
4 0.09 0.22 0.00 0.19 0.29 
0.51 1.27 0.00 0.97 1.27 
5 -0.04 -0.10 -0.23 -0.02 0.24 
-0.27 -0.58 -1.11 -0.09 1.20 
F-value for Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test that the intercepts jointly equal to zero is 
9.84*** (significant at 1 percent level) SR(α): 1.26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 53
Table 2.5: Double Sorted Time Series Regressions – E Index 
 
This table reports the value of the intercepts obtained in three-factor model for 15 portfolios of NYSE 
stocks sorted by illiquidity and entrenchment index. Portfolios are formed yearly for the period 1990-2006. 
Panel A presents intercepts from the time series regression of three-factor model as in the following 
equation ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߛ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߜ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߝ௜,௧,  where ݎ௜,௧  − ݎ௙,௧is the excess return 
on portfolio i in year t, a and ൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯, ܪܯܮ௧, ܵܯܤ௧, are the Fama and French (1993) factors related to 
market premium, the book-to-market ratio and the firm size in year t. The portfolios are sorted 
independently and portfolio 1,1 has the lowest illiquidity and is the most democratic. Panel B presents the 
portfolios sorted dependently. The bottom of each panel presents the Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test of 
the hypothesis that the intercepts jointly equal zero for the four-factor model. Intercepts are reported in 
absolute terms (t-statistics are in italics). 
 
Panel A: Sorted independently 
Illiquidity groups 
1 2 3 4 5 
E Index 1 0.14 0.06 0.24 0.32 0.22 
1.44 0.33 1.21 1.55 1.13 
groups 2 0.15 0.04 -0.04 0.24 0.52 
1.54 0.28 -0.25 1.35 3.36 
3 -0.12 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.17 
-0.68 -0.23 0.00 0.02 0.88 
F-value for Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test that the intercepts jointly equal to zero is 
9.92*** (significant at 1 percent level) SR(α): 0.96 
Panel B: Sorted dependently 
Illiquidity groups 
1 2 3 4 5 
E Index 1 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.37 0.23 
1.44 0.35 0.28 1.98 1.21 
groups 2 0.19 0.04 0.01 0.17 0.53 
1.81 0.25 0.05 0.97 3.12 
3 0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.27 
0.29 -0.23 0.00 0.02 1.45 
F-value for Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test that the intercepts jointly equal to zero is 
10.21*** (significant at 1 percent level) SR(α): 0.97 
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Table 2.6 – G and E Index Clustering 
 
This table reports the average excess return of each G and E index value sorted from high to low from 1990 
to 2006. %ME shows the percentage market equity of the respective G or E index value to the overall 
market equity. Low LIQ (High LIQ) reports the percentage weight (in terms of market equity) of the 
respective G or E index value in the worst (best) liquidity group.  Finally, the average illiquidity and the 
average of Pastor-Stambaugh’s liquidity factor are reported. 
 
 
G Index Excess Return PercentME Low LIQ High LIQ Illiquidity PS Liq 
6 0.93% 11.6% 8.3% 12.5% 0.23 -2.50 
10 0.67% 10.5% 13.1% 10.2% 0.43 -2.58 
8 0.61% 10.8% 11.9% 10.7% 0.34 -2.64 
7 0.59% 11.4% 10.0% 11.9% 0.29 -2.63 
14 0.56% 4.0% 5.7% 3.3% 0.61 -2.28 
13 0.55% 9.0% 7.2% 9.1% 0.32 -2.78 
5 0.52% 7.7% 9.7% 8.0% 0.44 -2.46 
11 0.49% 12.4% 12.0% 12.0% 0.34 -2.55 
9 0.44% 13.4% 13.6% 13.4% 0.34 -2.73 
12 0.39% 9.2% 8.5% 8.9% 0.34 -2.50 
       
E Index Excess Return PercentME LowLIQ HighLIQ Illiquidity PS Liq 
2 0.71% 25.6% 23.6% 26.1% 0.32 -2.58 
5 0.68% 2.1% 4.7% 1.6% 0.73 -2.17 
4 0.65% 11.6% 19.7% 9.8% 0.54 -2.58 
0 0.63% 22.1% 8.3% 24.7% 0.17 -2.58 
3 0.49% 21.0% 27.1% 19.6% 0.44 -2.60 
1 0.37% 17.6% 16.8% 18.2% 0.33 -2.65 
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Table 2.7 – Annual G and E Index Clustering 
This table reports the annual difference in percent between the market equity of liquidity groups and 
average market equity of G index groups. The percentage of the category’s total market capitalization 
contained in each G index value is calculated for low illiquidity, high illiquidity and the entire sample. The 
absolute difference in a G’s percentage of total market capitalization is reported for each category, 
averaged over all G index values each year. Panel B shows the same for the E index. All p-values for Panel 
A are less than 0.01. In Panel B, all p-values are less than 0.01 except the ones with an asterisk, which are 
less than 0.05.  
 
Panel A: G Index 
Year High Liquidity Low Liquidity Low - High Liquidity 
1990 1.79% 9.65% 7.86% 
1991 1.48% 9.50% 8.02% 
1992 1.70% 9.68% 7.98% 
1993 1.78% 9.64% 7.85% 
1994 1.89% 9.69% 7.80% 
1995 1.51% 9.48% 7.97% 
1996 1.52% 9.60% 8.09% 
1997 1.36% 9.55% 8.19% 
1998 1.16% 9.58% 8.42% 
1999 0.94% 9.72% 8.77% 
2000 1.06% 9.82% 8.76% 
2001 1.29% 9.88% 8.59% 
2002 1.45% 9.96% 8.51% 
2003 1.18% 9.60% 8.41% 
2004 1.34% 9.63% 8.29% 
2005 1.47% 9.65% 8.19% 
2006 1.47% 9.60% 8.13% 
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Panel B: E Index 
Year High Liquidity Low Liquidity Low - High Liquidity 
1990 2.98% 16.08% 13.10%* 
1991 2.47% 15.84% 13.37% 
1992 2.84% 16.14% 13.29% 
1993 2.97% 16.06% 13.09% 
1994 3.15% 16.14% 12.99% 
1995 2.52% 15.80% 13.29% 
1996 2.53% 16.01% 13.48% 
1997 2.27% 15.91% 13.6%* 
1998 1.94% 15.97% 14.03% 
1999 1.57%* 16.20% 14.62%* 
2000 1.77% 16.37% 14.59%* 
2001 2.14% 16.47% 14.32% 
2002 2.42%* 16.61% 14.19% 
2003 1.97%* 15.99% 14.02% 
2004 2.24%* 16.06% 13.82% 
2005 2.44%* 16.09% 13.65% 
2006 2.45%* 16.00% 13.55%* 
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Table 2.8 – Mimicking Portfolios 
 
This table reports in panel A the annual average illiquidity values of very liquid and very illiquid portfolios 
across G index values as well as portfolios across the same G index values mimicking these portfolios. For 
the purpose of mimicking G index clustering in the least liquid portfolio, only firms that are not in the least 
liquid portfolio are selected. Likewise, only “non-most liquid” portfolios are selected for mimicking G 
index clustering in the most liquid portfolio. Firms in the random trials are chosen such that the total market 
capitalization of each G index values in the trial portfolio is proportional to the market capitalization of that 
G in the respective hedge, least liquid, or most liquid portfolio. Panel B reports the annual average G index 
values of democratic and dictatorial portfolios across liquidity values as well as portfolios mimicking these 
portfolios.  Panels C and D repeat the above two procedures for the E index.  p-values for the difference 
test between mimicking portfolios  and the difference in differences test between extreme and mimicking 
portfolios are less than 0.0001 for all four panels. 
 
Panel A: Average Illiquidity 
Least liquid stocks 0.28 
Mimi least liquid stocks 0.02 
Most liquid stocks 0.00 
Mimi most liquid stocks 0.04 
Panel B: Average G Index 
Democratic stocks 4.6 
Mimic democratic stocks 10.1 
Dictatorial stocks 14.5 
Mimic dictatorial stocks 9.2 
Panel C: Average Illiquidity 
Least liquid stocks 0.28 
Mimi least liquid stocks 0.02 
Most liquid stocks 0.00 
Mimi most liquid stocks 0.05 
Panel D: Average E Index 
Democratic stocks 0.00 
Mimic democratic stocks 2.74 
Dictatorial stocks 5.10 
Mimic dictatorial stocks 2.41 
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Table 2.9 – Specification Regressions on Mimicking Portfolios 
The numbers in each row represent the percentage of the 250 random trials that reject the null hypothesis of 
zero mean monthly abnormal return at theoretical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis of the intercept being significantly negative on the left tail, or significantly positive 
on the right tail. Long-run abnormal returns are measured by the regression intercept using the four-factor 
model. Excess returns are regressed on RMRF, SMB, HML, and UMD. In Panel A, portfolio returns which 
are long in mimicking most liquid stocks and short in mimicking least liquid stocks are used, then 
mimicking most (least) liquid stocks are employed. In Panel B, portfolio returns which are long in 
mimicking “democratic” stocks and short in mimicking “dictatorial” stocks are used, then mimicking 
“democratic” (“dictatorial”) stocks are employed. Panels C and D repeat the above two procedures for the 
E index. *, **, ***, significantly different from the theoretical rejection rate at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
statistical levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Theoretical Rejection Rates 
 10% 5% 1% 
 Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail 
 5% 95% 2.50% 97.50% 0.50% 99.50% 
Hedge portfolio 30.8%*** 28.4%*** 26.8%*** 26.8%*** 23.2%*** 21.6%*** 
Mimic least liquid stocks 1.60% 14%*** 0.40% 7.6%*** 0.40% 2%*** 
Mimic most liquid stocks 0.00% 49.6%*** 0.00% 36.8%*** 0.00% 16.4%*** 
Panel B: Theoretical Rejection Rates 
 10% 5% 1% 
 Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail 
 5% 95% 2.50% 97.50% 0.50% 99.50% 
Hedge portfolio 60.4%*** 32.4%*** 60%*** 31.2%*** 56.8%*** 30.4%*** 
Mimic democratic stocks 0.00% 100%*** 0.00% 100%*** 0.00% 100%*** 
Mimic dictatorial stocks 0.00% 16%*** 0.00% 10.8%*** 0.00% 4%*** 
Panel C: Theoretical Rejection Rates 
 10% 5% 1% 
 Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail 
 5% 95% 2.50% 97.50% 0.50% 99.50% 
Hedge portfolio 38%*** 26%*** 33.2%*** 23.2%*** 28.4%*** 20.4%*** 
Mimic least liquid stocks 2.40% 11.2%*** 0.80% 6.4%*** 0.00% 2%*** 
Mimic most liquid stocks 0.00% 37.2%*** 0.00% 25.6%*** 0.00% 11.6%*** 
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Panel D: Theoretical Rejection Rates 
 10% 5% 1% 
 Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail 
 5% 95% 2.50% 97.50% 0.50% 99.50% 
Hedge portfolio 60%*** 33.6%*** 58.4%*** 33.6%*** 56.4%*** 31.6%*** 
Mimic democratic stocks 0.00% 100%*** 0.00% 100%*** 0.00% 100%*** 
Mimic dictatorial stocks 0.00% 21.2%*** 0.00% 12.8%*** 0.00% 3.2%*** 
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CHAPTER 3: GOVERNANCE AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN ASSET PRICING 
3.1. Introduction 
Information is the most valuable product made anywhere in the world. It is the 
key to interact sensibly and successfully with our environment. To make smart choices, 
we need to know as much about the consequences of our actions as possible. The more 
information we have, the better we are able to compete for scarce resources and 
outperform our competitors. Investors face the same challenges in the financial markets. 
The better a company is able to predict future pay-offs, the better her investment choices 
will be and the higher her returns for a given level of risk. But investors are aware that 
they do not have all necessary information available at any given point in time. In fact, 
lack of information poses a risk for investors (see Barry and Brown (1986)). Hence, 
investors demand a premium for that disadvantage. Easley et al. (2002) developed a 
theoretical model in which private information affects the price evolution and 
subsequently the risk of holding a stock. Moreover, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
constructed a governance index and found significant abnormal returns holding a 
portfolio long in well-governed stocks, and short in poorly governed stocks. Both are 
linked to the disclosure policies of companies. Healy and Palepu (2001) provided a 
framework for these policies: good governance is related to better disclosure policies and 
less information asymmetry. Sufi (2007) found that financial disclosure could help reduce 
information asymmetry. We contribute to the literature by looking at the interaction of 
these two factors: corporate governance and asymmetric information between investors. 
As a proxy of the former, we used the governance index (G index) by Gompers, Ishii and 
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Metrick (2003), and the entrenchment index (E index) created by Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Ferrell (2009). We also adopted the methodology of Huang and Stoll (1997) to obtain our 
adverse selection variable, which we used as a proxy for asymmetric information 
between investors. Our results confirm the importance of each factor separately and 
hence corroborate the importance of governance in asset pricing despite recent studies 
like Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006), who found a dwindling governance premium. 
Furthermore, we ascertained the importance of microstructure measures in asset pricing 
by employing Huang and Stoll’s (1997) method to extract an adverse selection variable 
and finding evidence for its explanatory power in four-factor regressions. 
We first ran the Fama-French (1993) three-factors, plus the Carhart (1997) 
momentum factor on sorted portfolios to establish the importance of each variable 
separately. Next, we used portfolios that were double-sorted on governance and adverse 
selection in four-factor regressions to jointly analyze these two variables. Our results 
showed that both factors are significant and do not dominate one another. Then we 
examined the clustering of adverse selection in governance portfolios and performed this 
analysis for each year. The results indicated that clustering is present but not systematic. 
To confirm this, we created mimicking portfolios in the spirit of Johnson, Moorman and 
Sorescu (2009) in the following way: We took only companies that were not in the “most 
adverse selection” group or in the “least adverse selection” group, but we ensured that the 
relative weights of these companies in the various governance groups were preserved. 
Hence, our mimicking portfolios were adverse-selection-neutral. Additionally, we 
conversed the experiment for governance portfolios and chose only “non-democratic” 
and “non-dictatorial” companies with the same adverse selection profile so the portfolios 
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were governance-neutral. Both sets of mimicking portfolios were then used in 250 
specification regressions to determine the influence of either adverse selection or 
governance clustering. The results confirmed our previous findings that clustering is 
present but unsystematic. Therefore, we can say that neither factor dominates the other 
and that our empirical analysis finds ample evidence in support of our alternative 
hypotheses. Governance and adverse selection are important factors in asset pricing; they 
are measuring two different dimensions of information risk that are essential to investors’ 
choices. 
Section 3.2 gives a brief overview of the relevant literature; Section 3.3 explains 
the data and methodology used in this study. Section 3.4 presents the results and Section 
3.5 concludes this paper. 
3.2. Literature Review and Development of Hypothesis 
Corporate governance shapes the rules between investors and managers. Before 
the 1980s, these rules were stable, but the internal control mechanism failed in the 1970s 
and 1980s, according to Jensen (1993); since then, however, many companies have 
adopted new rules that vary significantly across firms to address these problems. Firms 
adopted anti-takeover amendments, although for different reasons. Some firms try to 
deter potential bidders because they believe standing alone provides a higher return for 
investors in the long run, while others just want to wield more bargaining power in the 
takeover process. Managers are, on the other hand, willing to use this issue to pursue their 
own goals. By and large the market seems not to be deterred by those laws. Comment and 
Schwert (1994) found evidence that poison pills and anti-takeover laws did not 
systematically cause a decline in takeovers, but buyers had to pay a premium if such 
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measures were in place. Cremers and Nair (2005) found a range of mechanisms on the 
firm level connected to governance. These mechanisms can be divided into two 
categories: external and internal governance mechanisms. “External” governance means 
primarily the presence of anti-takeover provisions, whereas “internal” refers to block 
holders. Shareholders with a significant amount of shares have an incentive to monitor 
the management more closely and facilitate takeovers, according to Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986). Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) constructed an index from Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) publications and called it the “Governance index” 
(G index). They chose 28 corporate governance provisions, 24 of which were distinctive 
measures that characterized the interaction of management and investors. These measures 
were grouped into 5 categories: manager protections, tactics for delaying hostile bidders, 
state laws, voting rights, and other takeover defenses. A hedge portfolio investing in 
stocks with low G index values (i.e. good governance) and shortening stocks with high G 
index values (i.e. bad governance) earns an 8.5% annual rate of return. Thereafter, 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) suggested that only six provisions out of the 24 
above—four constitutional and two takeover-readiness provisions—are driving the 
results of Gompers et al. They called their index “Entrenchment index” (E index) and 
found that higher index values are significantly correlated with reduced company values, 
as measured by Tobin’s q. 
Our second string of interesting literature stems from research on adverse 
selection. The first strategic trading model was developed by Kyle (1985). In his model, 
insiders who have superior information about an underlying asset use their information 
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advantage strategically. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) modeled the bid-ask spread 
assuming that transaction costs and profits by the specialist are zero. Some traders 
possess superior information than the specialist. In their model, adverse selection by itself 
can account for the bid-ask spread, which depends on many parameters, including the 
exogenous arrival pattern of insiders and outsiders, the elasticity of supply and demand 
among outsiders, and the quality of insider information. Easley et al. (2002) developed a 
theoretical model in which private information affects the price evolution and 
subsequently the risk holding a stock. They used a sequential market microstructure 
model to come up with a measure of the probability of information-based trading for a 
single stock. Using Fama and French (1993) style regressions, the significance of the so-
called PIN measure is confirmed for NYSE stocks. The authors also looked into the 
possibility of capturing another variable such as volume, turnover or spread with their 
PIN measure. Thereafter, Duarte and Young (2009) investigated the PIN measure and its 
effects on asset prices by separating it into an asymmetric and a liquidity component. 
First, the authors extended the previous models by allowing for symmetric order flow 
shocks to account for positive correlations between buy and sell order flow. This way 
they got new measures, called adjusted PIN (for asymmetric shocks), and the probability 
of symmetric order flow shocks, or PSOS (for symmetric or liquidity shocks). They then 
empirically chose the version of their model in which the parameters better fit the data, 
and showed that PSOS is related to liquidity measures (such as Amihud’s). Finally, they 
showed that in regressions including PIN and liquidity measures, only the latter are 
significant. Bharath et al. (2009) used a microstructure measure, the information 
asymmetry index, to establish that adverse selection affects capital structure decisions. 
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Governance and information asymmetry are linked through the disclosure policies of 
companies, for which Healy and Palepu (2001) provided a framework. They 
hypothesized that information asymmetry drives the need for financial reporting and 
disclosure. Also, Armstrong, Guay and Weber (2010) emphasized in their survey paper 
the effects of information asymmetry on governance. They viewed the company as 
consisting and existing in a web of contracts. Some of these contracts are explicit but 
others are only implicit. These implicit contracts, nevertheless, play an important role in 
the governance of a company. Empirically, Sufi (2007), for example, found supportive 
evidence in the syndicated loan market that efficient financial reporting mitigates 
information asymmetry problems between borrowers and lenders. Otherwise, lenders 
have to increase their monitoring and form a more concentrated syndicate. 
According to Van Ness, Van Ness and Warr (2001), the most appropriate adverse 
selection measure for our purposes is the one developed by Huang and Stoll (1997)12, as 
it shows low correlation with other variables. To construct our measure for adverse 
selection, we borrowed their methodology. They constructed a model that allows 
distinguishing the components of the bid-ask spreads. Adverse selection, inventory 
holding costs and order processing costs are separated from each other in a basic trade 
indicator model. Then the model is modified to distinguish between small, medium and 
large trades to show how the composition of the spread changes. The authors estimated 
their model with adjusting for clustering of trades because large trades typically are split 
                                                             
12 The other models considered: Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997); Lin, Sanger, and Booth 
(1995); George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991); Glosten and Harris (1988). 
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up and make inferences from the covariance difficult. All trades at the same price and in 
the absence of quote changes are lumped into a single order.  
Our first null hypothesis states that liquidity is not priced, while our second null 
hypothesis states that governance is not a priced factor anymore. Lastly, we hypothesize 
that liquidity dominates governance. Alternatively, both factors—adverse selection and 
governance—are still priced and neither factor dominates the other. 
3.3 Data and Methodology  
Our sample data includes all CRSP companies except for utility and financial 
companies between 1993 and 2006. We excluded these due to their highly regulated legal 
environment. Next, we kept firm-months when the trading volume was above 10,000, the 
share price was above $5, and shares outstanding exceeded $5,000,000. Then, we merged 
these companies with the governance index data obtained from Metrick’s homepage and 
with the entrenchment index data compiled by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009). This 
was obtained from Bebchuk’s homepage. Following common practice, we retained the 
value of the indices until a new index value became available. Since the indices were 
constrained by their availability, our dataset ended in 2006. On the other hand, we were 
only able to calculate a meaningful adverse selection variable from 1993 and thereafter. 
The final dataset contains 1,961 companies—from 762 companies in 1993 to 989 in 2006, 
with a low of 751 in 1994 and a high of 1,143 in 2004.  
The first step in our analysis was to calculate abnormal returns of portfolios sorted 
on both the G and E index, as well as adverse selection to see whether the standard four-
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factor model (Fama-French three-factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor) is 
able to explain these returns or not. Additionally, we calculated the GRS test statistic 
proposed by Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) to determine if intercepts jointly equal 
zero for the four-factor model. Therefore, we sorted the sample companies into five 
(three) groups or portfolios based on their adverse selection, or G (E) index separately. 
The number of portfolios depended on the range of the variable. Then the excess returns 
of the companies were regressed on the four factors as follows:  
ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߛ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߜ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߠ௜ܴܲ1ܻܴ௧ + ߝ௜,௧                      (1) 
 
where r୧,୲ − r୤,୲ is the excess return of portfolio i in year t, and ൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯, ܵܯܤ௧,
ܪܯܮ௧are the Fama and French (1993) factors related to market premium, firm size, and 
the book-to-market ratio in year t. ܴܲ1ܻܴ௧ is Carhart’s momentum factor. In time-series 
regressions, a well-specified asset-pricing model that is not overly affected by 
multicollinearity or endogeneity creates intercepts that are not different from zero, 
according to Merton (1973) and Fama and French (1993). 
 In our next step, we double sorted the data into several portfolios according to 
adverse selection and governance characteristics. We either sorted the data independently 
or on an adverse selection dependent. Then we ran time series analyses of portfolio 
returns, controlling for the four factors as described above. Afterwards, we examined the 
concentration of adverse selection in the 10 G index portfolios13, sorted in descending 
                                                             
13 We combined all companies with an index value of less than or equal to 5 in one portfolio. We did the 
same for all companies with index values higher or equal to 14 into one portfolio, similar as Johnson et al. 
(2009). 
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order by average excess returns. The purpose was to detect any clustering of adverse 
selection in the indices (it is possible that adverse selection might be simply driven by 
governance characteristics). Additionally, we investigated clustering annually by 
calculating the difference between the market equity of adverse selection groups and the 
average market equity of G index or E index groups in percent (%) for each year.  
Lastly, we adopted a methodology similar to Johnson et al. (2009), calculating 
mimicking portfolios. We then ran specification regressions with these mimicking 
portfolios, which are constructed as follows: to mimic the highest adverse selection 
portfolio, all companies that are not in this portfolio but have the same G index profile 
were selected. Similarly, only “non-least adverse selection” portfolios were selected for 
mimicking G index clustering in the least adverse selection portfolio. Companies were 
then chosen in random trials in such a way that the total market capitalization of each G 
index value in the “original” portfolio was the same in the respective mimicking portfolio. 
Additionally, we performed the same procedure with the E index instead of the G index. 
Then we performed the converse experiment by selecting portfolios to find adverse 
selection clustering among G index groups. For that, we picked companies so that the 
total market capitalization of the “original” democratic or dictatorial portfolio across 10 
adverse selection portfolios was unchanged in portfolios mimicking the democratic or 
dictatorial portfolio. Using these portfolios, we ran 250 random trials to test the 
hypothesis of zero mean monthly abnormal returns at theoretical significance levels of 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Long-run abnormal returns were measured by the 
regression intercept using the four-factor model. These procedures allowed us to detect 
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any clustering of adverse selection or governance in sorted portfolios and to conclude 
whether either factor dominates the other. In other words, we were able to see if the 
model is well specified. 
3.4 Results 
First, we present the summary statistics in Table 3.1 and the Pearson correlations 
in Table 3.2. Adverse selection (AS) is high during the 90s and peaks at 0.46 in 2000, 
then declines quickly (see also Figure 3.1) to 0.13. Both G and E indices decline 
moderately over time, indicating increasing shareholder rights. The G index falls to 8.75 
from 9.41 and the E index to 1.66 from 1.97. Both indices are significantly negatively 
correlated with adverse selection with -0.03 and -0.08, respectively. 
Next, we look into the abnormal returns of portfolios sorted by our three key 
variables and find that the four-factor model is not able to explain such portfolios. 
Furthermore, a pattern is discernable in which the high adverse selection (t = 3.2) and 
most democratic portfolios (t = 2.21 for G index and t = 2.96 for E index) command a 
significant positive premium. Then the premium vanishes as adverse selection diminishes 
and the portfolios are less democratic (see Table 3.3). The GRS test for the joint 
significance of the intercepts is also significant at the 1% level. Then we investigate the 
joint effect of adverse selection and corporate governance by sorting the data accordingly. 
First, we sort the data on adverse selection, and then (either independently or dependently) 
on the adverse selection portfolios based on either the G or E index. The results again 
show a pattern. Across adverse selection groups, the abnormal returns increase in both 
tables in Table 3.4. Column 5, with the highest adverse selection values, is significantly 
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positive and the GRS tests are twice as significant at the 1% level. The G index shows a 
less pronounced pattern. Only the 1-1 portfolios (meaning the most democratic and least 
adverse selected) in both tables highlight the importance of corporate governance. In 
Table 3.5, this pattern of increasing abnormal returns across adverse selection portfolios 
is again visible, with Column 5 showing significantly positive alphas. The E index shows 
a less salient result for the 1-1 portfolio. Once again, the GRS tests are significant at the 
1% level. In general, the results are similar for all four tables (of Tables 3.4 and 3.5) and 
support the notion that both factors are important in asset pricing despite the somewhat 
weak results for the G and E index. To further examine the relation of governance and 
adverse selection, we reexamine their interaction. 
We look into the G and E index clustering of adverse selection to see if the results 
for adverse selection are driven by corporate governance characteristics. Table 3.6 
presents the average adverse selection for each G and E index value sorted by descending 
excess returns. Additionally, the relative market equity and the relative market equity of 
high and low adverse selection portfolios are shown. Average adverse selection is fairly 
evenly distributed across G and E index values. As expected, adverse selection is slightly 
falling along decreasing excess returns to 0.25 from 0.30, and to 0.25 from 0.33 for the G 
and E index, respectively. In addition, the most democratic E index value falls from 
dictatorial to democratic with decreasing excess returns, which is unusual given the 
“democracy premium.” Relative market equity is low in G index value 14 (3.38%) and 
high in 9 (14.81%). The high and low adverse selection portfolios follow a similar pattern 
and no bias is apparent, as one group is alternately greater or less than the other. In the E 
index, however, high adverse selection market equity is only greater than low adverse 
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selection market equity in the most democratic portfolio. Here, adverse selection and the 
E index appear more intertwined.  
Moving onto the annual clustering, we calculate the average market equity across 
G and E index values and subtract it from the market equity of the low adverse selection 
portfolio, then from the high adverse selection portfolio (see Table 3.7). Finally, we 
calculate the difference between the market equities of low and high adverse selection 
portfolios across corporate governance groups. Most of the differences are significant at 
the 1% level. All but one are significant—the low minus high adverse selection 
difference, which is generally less significant with the E index. Overall, this indicates that 
adverse selection is not evenly distributed across governance characteristics and could 
lead to the conclusion that governance dominates adverse selection. Therefore, we 
conduct an additional analysis following Johnson, Moorman and Sorescu (2006), to see 
whether the clustering in governance portfolios is random or influences the premium 
found for adverse selection earlier in our study. 
Hence, we intend to separate the adverse selection effect and the governance 
clustering effect from each other by emulating the governance clustering of adverse 
selection portfolios. We then form portfolios with stocks that are not in the high or low 
adverse selection group and run specification regressions on these mimicking portfolios. 
Additionally, we conduct the reverse experiment by emulating the adverse selection 
clustering of G and E index portfolios. Table 3.8 presents the means of all portfolios; in 
Panel A, we see that the average adverse selection of the highest adverse selection 
portfolio is 0.59 and the least 0.04, whereas the mimicking portfolios have averages of 
0.18 and 0.25, respectively. It is a common effect of this method that the mimicking 
 72
portfolios have lower values for “most” portfolios and vice versa. The difference in 
differences shows at the 1% level that the mimicking portfolios have a narrower 
difference than the “original” portfolio. This is true for all four panels and only confirms 
that our method is working. In Panel C, the values are virtually the same using the E 
index instead of the G index. Panel B and D show the means of the G and E index, 
respectively. Most democratic G index stocks have an average of 4.5, while E index 
stocks have exactly zero. Dictatorial G stocks have an average of 14.5 (E index stocks 
5.1). The respective mimicking portfolios have averages of 9.8 and 9.0, and 2.6 and 2.4. 
Again the values seem reversed and the differences in differences are significant at the 
1% level. We then utilize the mimicking portfolios in simulations. The specification 
regression results are presented in Table 3.9. Overall, the results show that the four-factor 
model is not able to explain the mimicking portfolio returns well. All right tails are 
significant, while both tails are significant in hedge portfolios. This indicates that neither 
governance characteristics nor adverse selection characteristics dominate each other; 
rather, they are influenced by each other. A possible common source of information 
asymmetry can be attributed to that. Moreover, both factors are independently of 
importance, leading to our conclusion that investors price governance and adverse 
selection separately. This acts as evidence directly supporting our alternative hypothesis. 
3.5 Conclusion 
 Information is the key asset of our time, especially in the business world. The 
possession of it or the lack thereof decides who gains or loses on a trade. Two different 
variables measuring two different dimensions of information asymmetry have been 
employed in this study—governance and adverse selection. Corporate governance shapes 
 73
the relation between management and investors. But is it priced as a risk factor in face of 
the dwindling governance premium as expressed in recent studies? This paper reconfirms 
the findings of studies such as Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), by providing 
supportive evidence of a significant governance premium. Additionally, we contribute to 
the literature by confirming the importance of a microstructure in the asset-pricing 
paradigm. We generate an adverse selection variable based on Huang and Stoll’s (1997) 
methodology and show that is priced. Moreover, we jointly analyze governance and 
adverse selection and show that neither variable dominates the other. Investors are 
willing and able to distinguish between these two sources of information asymmetry 
when making investment decisions.  Further research in this area is warranted to 
determine exactly how these variables influence investors’ choices. 
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Figure 3.1: Time Series of Key Variables 
 
Figure 3.1a shows the annual averages of governance index and entrenchment index. Figure 3.1b shows the 
annual averages of adverse selection and excess stock returns. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents the mean, median and standard deviation of the key variables. Adverse selection is 
calculated following Huang and Stoll (1997). The governance index is taken from Metrick’s website and 
the entrenchment index from Bebchuk’s website. Panel B shows the annual averages of our key variables 
and excess returns.  
 
Panel A: 
G Index E Index AS 
25% quartile 7 2 0.11 
Median value 9 2 0.20 
75% quartile 11 3 0.29 
Mean value 9.40 2.43 0.22 
St. Dev. 2.70 1.30 0.16 
 
 
Panel B: 
Year Excess Return G Index E Index AS 
1993 0.47% 9.41 1.97 0.36 
1994 -0.03% 9.45 2.03 0.34 
1995 2.05% 9.25 1.83 0.34 
1996 1.34% 9.20 1.85 0.41 
1997 1.84% 9.31 1.87 0.38 
1998 2.11% 9.19 1.75 0.37 
1999 1.27% 9.07 1.60 0.42 
2000 -1.16% 9.12 1.58 0.46 
2001 -0.89% 9.26 1.70 0.32 
2002 -1.77% 9.17 1.88 0.23 
2003 2.19% 8.89 1.76 0.15 
2004 0.79% 9.02 1.86 0.12 
2005 0.29% 8.93 1.81 0.13 
2006 0.66% 8.75 1.66 0.13 
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Table 3.2: Simple Correlations 
This table reports time series averages of annual cross-sectional correlation of variables in asset pricing 
tests for all stocks over the period 1993-2006. Adverse selection is calculated following Huang and Stoll 
(1997). The governance index is taken from Metrick’s website and the entrenchment index from Bebchuk’s 
website. All correlations have p values that are less than 0.0001. 
 
G Index E Index AS 
G Index 1.00 0.74 -0.03 
E Index 0.74 1.00 -0.08 
AS -0.03 -0.08 1.00 
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Table 3.3: Single Sorted Time Series Regressions 
This table reports the value of the intercepts obtained in three-factor model for five portfolios of stocks 
sorted by adverse selection and G index. For the entrenchment index only three portfolios were used due to 
the small range of the variable. Adverse selection is calculated following Huang and Stoll (1997). 
Portfolios are formed yearly for the period 1993-2006. Panel A presents intercepts from the time series 
regression of three-factor model as in the following equation ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߛ௜ܪܯܮ௧ +
ߜ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߬௜ܷܯܦ௧ + ߝ௜,௧ ,  where ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ is the excess return on portfolio i in year t, and ൫ݎ௠,௧ −
ݎ௙,௧൯, ܪܯܮ௧, ܵܯܤ௧, are the Fama and French (1993) factors related to market premium, the book-to-market 
ratio and the firm size in year t and ܷܯܦ௧is Carhart’s momentum factor. The portfolios are sorted from 
lowest to highest levels of adverse selection. In Panel B they are sorted from most democratic to dictatorial 
according to the G index. Panel C presents the intercepts from sorting from most democratic to dictatorial 
according to the E index. The bottom of each panel presents the Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test of the 
hypothesis that the intercepts jointly equal zero for the four-factor model. Intercepts are reported in 
absolute terms (t-statistics are in italics). 
Panel A: Sorted by Adverse Selection 
1 2 3 4 5 
0.08 -0.08 -0.20 0.10 0.44 
0.46 -0.45 -1.13 0.74 3.20 
F-value for Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test that the intercepts jointly equal to zero is 
4.38*** (significant at 1 percent level) SR(α):0.40 
Panel B: Sorted by governance index 
1 2 3 4 5 
0.33 0.26 0.09 0.22 0.02 
2.21 2.05 0.71 1.45 0.11 
F-value for Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test that the intercepts jointly equal to zero is 
9.11*** (significant at 1 percent level) SR(α): 0.59 
Panel C: Sorted by entrenchment index 
1   2   3 
0.35 0.11 -0.13 
2.96   1.15   -0.91 
F-value for Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test that the intercepts jointly equal to zero is 
13.82*** (significant at 1 percent level) SR(α): 0.54 
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Table 3.4: Double Sorted Time Series Regressions – G Index 
 
This table reports the value of the intercepts obtained in three-factor model for 25 portfolios of stocks 
sorted by adverse selection and governance index. Adverse selection is calculated following Huang and 
Stoll (1997).  Portfolios are formed yearly for the period 1993-2006. Panel A presents intercepts from the 
time series regression of three-factor model as in the following equation ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ +
ߛ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߜ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߝ௜,௧ ,  where ݎ௜,௧  − ݎ௙,௧ is the excess return on portfolio i in year t, and ൫ݎ௠,௧ −
ݎ௙,௧൯, ܪܯܮ௧, ܵܯܤ௧, are the Fama and French (1993) factors related to market premium, the book-to-market 
ratio and the firm size in year t. The portfolios are sorted independently and portfolio 1,1 has the least 
adverse selection and is highly democratic. Panel B presents the portfolios sorted dependently. The bottom 
of each panel presents the Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test of the hypothesis that the intercepts jointly 
equal zero for the four-factor model. Intercepts are reported in absolute terms (t-statistics are in italics). 
Panel A: Sorted independently 
Adverse Selection Groups 
1 2 3 4 5 
G index 1 0.65 -0.03 0.39 0.27 0.52 
1.87 -0.10 1.01 0.89 1.92 
groups 2 -0.19 0.25 0.11 0.13 0.57 
-0.56 0.74 0.37 0.56 2.61 
3 0.13 -0.45 -0.22 -0.16 0.60 
0.52 -2.22 -0.80 -0.65 2.97 
4 0.01 0.27 -0.44 0.20 0.43 
0.03 1.02 -1.72 0.89 1.60 
5 -0.27 -0.49 -0.51 -0.05 0.65 
-1.10 -1.76 -1.56 -0.20 2.15 
F-value for Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test that the intercepts jointly equal to zero is 
10.53*** (significant at 1 percent level) SR(α): 1.46 
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Panel B: Sorted dependently 
Adverse Selection Groups 
1 2 3 4 5 
G index 1 0.50 -0.07 0.27 0.23 0.50 
1.51 -0.30 0.85 0.82 1.92 
groups 2 -0.14 0.20 -0.17 -0.14 1.03 
-0.44 0.59 -0.54 -0.54 4.04 
3 0.14 -0.56 0.06 -0.02 0.44 
0.49 -2.17 0.23 -0.07 1.92 
4 -0.06 0.37 -0.47 0.24 0.40 
-0.23 1.32 -1.69 0.86 1.41 
5 -0.25 -0.34 -0.39 -0.13 0.57 
-1.06 -1.45 -1.51 -0.66 2.55 
F-value for Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test that the intercepts jointly equal to zero is 
8.32*** (significant at 1 percent level) SR(α): 1.32 
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Table 3.5: Double Sorted Time Series Regressions – E Index 
This table reports the value of the intercepts obtained in three-factor model for 15 portfolios of stocks 
sorted by adverse selection and entrenchment index. Adverse selection is calculated following Huang and 
Stoll (1997). Portfolios are formed yearly for the period 1993-2006. Panel A presents intercepts from the 
time series regression of three-factor model as in the following equation ݎ௜,௧ି௥೑,೟ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜൫ݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ +
ߛ௜ܪܯܮ௧ + ߜ௜ܵܯܤ௧ + ߝ௜,௧ ,  where ݎ௜,௧  − ݎ௙,௧ is the excess return on portfolio i in year t, and ൫ݎ௠,௧ −
ݎ௙,௧൯, ܪܯܮ௧, ܵܯܤ௧, are the Fama and French (1993) factors related to market premium, the book-to-market 
ratio and the firm size in year t. The portfolios are sorted independently and portfolio 1,1 has the lowest 
adverse selection and it is the most democratic. Panel B presents the portfolios sorted dependently. The 
bottom of each panel presents the Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test of the hypothesis that the intercepts 
jointly equal zero for the four-factor model. Intercepts are reported in absolute terms (t-statistics are in 
italics). 
Panel A: Sorted independently 
Adverse Selection Groups 
1 2 3 4 5 
E Index 1 0.33 0.65 0.05 0.20 0.52 
1.10 2.28 0.18 0.93 2.58 
groups 2 -0.03 -0.33 -0.20 0.07 0.47 
-0.15 -1.88 -0.95 0.43 2.57 
3 -0.27 -0.30 -0.26 -0.11 0.10 
-1.26 -1.42 -1.28 -0.46 0.37 
F-value for Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test that the intercepts jointly equal to zero is 
8.15*** (significant at 1 percent level) SR(α): 0.96 
Panel B: Sorted dependently 
Adverse Selection Groups 
1 2 3 4 5 
E Index 1 0.36 0.71 0.18 0.20 0.57 
1.28 2.55 0.71 0.93 2.95 
groups 2 0.03 -0.45 -0.26 0.11 0.48 
0.15 -2.50 -1.21 0.64 2.68 
3 -0.26 -0.32 -0.26 -0.03 0.29 
-1.25 -1.48 -1.28 -0.16 1.25 
F-value for Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test that the intercepts jointly equal to zero is 
9.08*** (significant at 1 percent level) SR(α): 1.02 
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Table 3.6 – G and E Index Clustering 
 
This table reports the average excess return of each G and E index value sorted from high to low from 1993 
to 2006. %ME shows the percentage market equity of the respective G or E index value to the overall 
market equity. HighAS (LowAS) reports the percentage weight (in terms of market equity) of the 
respective G or E index value in the high (low) adverse selection group.  Finally, the average adverse 
selection value is reported. 
 
 
G Index Excess Return PercentME HighAS LowAS AS 
6 0.90% 10.42% 13.00% 8.37% 0.30 
7 0.76% 10.53% 10.94% 11.04% 0.30 
10 0.70% 10.54% 10.12% 10.49% 0.29 
14 0.60% 3.38% 3.22% 4.21% 0.27 
5 0.55% 9.19% 10.67% 7.10% 0.30 
13 0.48% 7.41% 6.84% 8.98% 0.26 
11 0.47% 14.70% 15.07% 13.82% 0.31 
9 0.39% 14.81% 12.40% 18.94% 0.24 
8 0.33% 11.02% 10.35% 9.84% 0.23 
12 0.29% 8.00% 7.39% 7.22% 0.25 
E Index Excess Return PercentME HighAS LowAS AS 
0 0.82% 25.09% 31.93% 20.71% 0.33 
5 0.76% 1.76% 1.23% 2.45% 0.21 
2 0.56% 24.38% 23.98% 24.38% 0.28 
4 0.55% 10.45% 9.80% 11.45% 0.25 
3 0.49% 19.20% 16.75% 21.58% 0.25 
1 0.18% 19.12% 16.31% 19.44% 0.25 
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Table 3.7 – Annual G and E Index Clustering 
This table reports the annual difference in percent between the market equity of adverse selection groups 
and average market equity of G and E index groups. The percentage of the category’s total market 
capitalization contained in each G index value is calculated for low adverse selection, high adverse 
selection and the entire sample. The absolute difference in a G’s percentage of total market capitalization is 
reported for each category, averaged over all G index values each year. In Panel B, the same variables are 
shown for the E index. *, **, *** indicate that the numder is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: G Index 
Year Low AS High AS Low - High 
1993 7.5%*** 4.9%*** 2.9%*** 
1994 7.8%*** 5.2%*** 3.2%*** 
1995 6.5%*** 5.2%*** 2.8%*** 
1996 7.4%*** 4.6%*** 2.8%*** 
1997 8.3%*** 3.4%*** 4.9%*** 
1998 8.3%*** 3.6%*** 4.7%*** 
1999 8.7%*** 3.3%*** 5.4%*** 
2000 9.5%*** 3.1%*** 6.3%*** 
2001 8.8%*** 5.1%*** 4.2%*** 
2002 8.5%*** 5.4%*** 3.2%*** 
2003 7.0%*** 6.1%*** 2.2%** 
2004 7.4%*** 6.2%*** 1.8%*** 
2005 6.8%*** 6.7%*** 2.2%*** 
2006 7.6%*** 6.6%*** 1.80%** 
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Panel B: E Index 
Year Low AS High AS Low - High 
1993 12.6%*** 8.2%*** 4.7% 
1994 13.0%*** 8.6%*** 4.4%* 
1995 10.8%*** 8.6%*** 2.2%* 
1996 12.4%*** 7.7%*** 4.7%** 
1997 13.9%*** 5.7%*** 8.3%** 
1998 13.9%*** 6.1%*** 7.9%** 
1999 14.5%** 5.5%*** 9.1%* 
2000 15.8%** 5.2%** 10.6%** 
2001 14.7%** 8.5%** 6.2%** 
2002 14.2%*** 9.0%*** 5.3%** 
2003 11.7%*** 10.1%*** 1.6%** 
2004 12.3%*** 10.3%*** 2.0%* 
2005 11.3%*** 11.1%*** 1.3%** 
2006 12.7%*** 11.1%** 1.9%** 
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Table 3.8 – Mimicking Portfolios 
This table reports in panel A the annual average adverse selection (AS) values of least AS and most AS 
portfolios across G index values as well as portfolios across the same G index values mimicking these 
portfolios. For the purpose of mimicking G index clustering in the most AS portfolio, only firms that are 
not in the most AS portfolio are selected. Likewise, only “non-least AS” portfolios are selected for 
mimicking G index clustering in the least AS portfolio. Firms in the random trials are chosen such that the 
total market capitalization of each G index values in the trial portfolio is proportional to the market 
capitalization of that G in the respective hedge, most AS, or least AS portfolio. Panel B reports the annual 
average G index values of democratic and dictatorial portfolios across adverse selection values as well as 
portfolios mimicking these portfolios.  Panels C and D repeat the above two procedures for the E index.  p-
values for the difference test between mimicking portfolios  and the difference in differences test between 
extreme and mimicking portfolios are less than 0.0001 for all four panels. 
Panel A: Average AS 
Most AS stocks 0.59 
Mimi most AS stocks 0.18 
Least AS stocks 0.04 
Mimi least AS stocks 0.25 
Panel B: Average G Index 
Democratic stocks 4.5 
Mimic democratic stocks 9.8 
Dictatorial stocks 14.5 
Mimic dictatorial stocks 9.0 
Panel C: Average AS 
Most AS stocks 0.59 
Mimi most AS stocks 0.19 
Least AS stocks 0.04 
Mimi least AS stocks 0.25 
Panel D: Average E Index 
Democratic stocks 0.0 
Mimic democratic stocks 2.6 
Dictatorial stocks 5.1 
Mimic dictatorial stocks 2.4 
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Table 3.9 – Specification Regressions on Mimicking Portfolios 
The numbers in each row represent the percentage of the 250 random trials that reject the null hypothesis of 
zero mean monthly abnormal return at theoretical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis of the intercept being significantly negative on the left tail, or significantly positive 
on the right tail. Long-run abnormal returns are measured by the regression intercept using the four-factor 
model. Excess returns are regressed on RMRF, SMB, HML, and UMD. In Panel A, portfolio returns which 
are long in mimicking least AS stocks and short in mimicking most AS stocks are used, then mimicking 
least (most) AS stocks are employed. In Panel B, portfolio returns which are long in mimicking 
“democratic” stocks and short in mimicking “dictatorial” stocks are used, then mimicking “democratic” 
(“dictatorial”) stocks are employed. .  Panels C and D repeat the above two procedures for the E index. *, 
**, ***, significantly different from the theoretical rejection rate at the 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Theoretical Rejection Rates 
 10% 5% 1% 
 Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail 
 5% 95% 2.50% 97.50% 0.50% 99.50% 
Hedge portfolio 11.2%*** 46.4%*** 8.4%*** 38.8%*** 5.2%*** 26.4%*** 
Mimic least AS stocks 0% 97.2%*** 0% 93.6%*** 0% 73.2%*** 
Mimic most AS stocks 0% 47.6%*** 0% 35.6%*** 0% 18%*** 
Panel B: Theoretical Rejection Rates 
 10% 5% 1% 
 Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail 
 5% 95% 2.50% 97.50% 0.50% 99.50% 
Hedge portfolio 18.4%*** 69.6%*** 16.4%*** 68.4%*** 14.8%*** 66.4%*** 
Mimic democratic stocks 0% 100%*** 0% 100%*** 0% 100%*** 
Mimic dictatorial stocks 0.40% 21.2%*** 0% 12.8%*** 0% 2.8%*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 86
Panel C: Theoretical Rejection Rates 
 10% 5% 1% 
 Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail 
 5% 95% 2.50% 97.50% 0.50% 99.50% 
Hedge portfolio 10%*** 43.6%*** 7.6%*** 39.2%*** 3.6%*** 31.2%*** 
Mimic least AS stocks 0% 92.8%*** 0% 87.6%*** 0% 66.0%*** 
Mimic most AS stocks 0% 40.8%*** 0% 30.0%*** 0% 14.0%*** 
Panel D: Theoretical Rejection Rates 
 10% 5% 1% 
 Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail Left Tail Right Tail 
 5% 95% 2.50% 97.50% 0.50% 99.50% 
Hedge portfolio 32.0%*** 49.2%*** 30.8%*** 47.6%*** 28.4%*** 44.8%*** 
Mimic democratic stocks 0% 99.2%*** 0% 96.8%*** 0% 89.2%*** 
Mimic dictatorial stocks 0% 12.4%*** 0% 7.6%*** 0% 2.0%*** 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation focuses on crucial risk factors in asset pricing, such as liquidity, 
governance and adverse selection risks. These factors provide unique insights into 
different liquidity aspects. For example, governance and adverse selection are potential 
proxies for information asymmetry that could be better captured by the market liquidity 
of a company’s shares. Hence, a thorough examination of variables related to liquidity is 
warranted. The methodology in this dissertation includes, among other analyses, 
specification regressions using mimicking portfolios—a technique adopted by Johnson, 
Moorman and Sorescu (2009). The mimicking portfolios used in this research are formed 
using all but the extreme portfolios of the variables of interest. The relative weights that 
the extreme portfolios have in the second variable of interest are then preserved. That 
way, the model is neutral in one variable, and the influence of the other can be examined 
in detail. Next, these mimicking portfolios are employed in specification regressions, 
which are a type of Monte Carlo simulation. This allows for valuable insight into the 
interaction of this study’s key variables. Liquidity risk and industry clustering are 
investigated in the first chapter, and it was determined that both are important in 
explaining stock returns. The study uses two proxies for liquidity–Amihud’s Illiquidity as 
well as Pastor-Stambaugh’s liquidity factor. The results corroborate the findings of Fama 
and French (1997) and other researchers, who emphasize the importance of an industry’s 
effects on its firms. It also emphasizes the results of previous liquidity studies by Amihud 
(2002) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005), highlighting the importance of liquidity. We 
conclude that a comprehensive asset-pricing model should include industry effects and 
liquidity. 
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The study also concentrated on the interaction of governance and liquidity. 
Information asymmetry acts as an intermediary between the two factors. Despite recent 
research showing diminishing premia for governance and liquidity, we can reconfirm 
their importance in explaining stock returns.  Therefore, we performed several standard 
asset-pricing tests of the joint effect of governance and liquidity on the asset-pricing 
paradigm. Our results corroborate the findings of Amihud (2002) and Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003). But detailed analysis revealed that liquidity is clustered in governance-
sorted portfolios. So we further ran specification regressions of portfolios mimicking 
liquidity or governance clustering in the extreme portfolios to show that this clustering is 
unsystematic. Hence, we conclude that governance and liquidity contribute significantly 
to asset-pricing models independently from one another.  
The dissertation concludes by examining the interaction of governance and 
adverse selection, and the results reconfirm once more the importance of governance in 
asset pricing. We generated an adverse selection variable based on Huang and Stoll’s 
(1997) methodology and found that it is in fact priced. Governance and adverse selection 
can be both interpreted as measuring information asymmetry. Hence, a joint study of both 
is interesting and insightful. The main findings suggest that the two factors are priced 
individually but that they are both influencing one another. Further research in this area is 
warranted and essential in understanding the impact of information on the prices of 
financial assets. All three studies together provide an important new view into interaction 
of factors beyond the four-factor model. These factors–governance, liquidity and adverse 
selection–will shape our future understanding of asset pricing. 
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